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Abstract 
 
Purpose: Long-term orientation is very crucial in the strategic buying as well as in 
increasing competitive advantage but it is still less researched within buyer-supplier 
relationship society. In this study, factors towards long-term orientation which are 
opportunism, buyer-specific investment, supplier performance, supplier flexibility and 
supplier-specific investment were examined. 
 
Methodology/ Design: The empirical analysis of this study  based on automobile company; 
Superdoll Trailer Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Data were collected from 86 customers of this 
company to test what will determine them to stay long in doing business with this supplier. 
 
Findings: The key findings of this study show that, customers are willing to stay longer in 
a business relationship if they made specific asset with this supplier. At the same time, the 
specific investment by supplier has significance effect on business continuity at the 
increasing effect of supplier flexibility. Although opportunism has no significant effect on 
long-term orientation, supplier performance has a positive significant effect on long-term 
orientation. 
 
Limitations: The study find difficult to generalize the findings of this studynto other 
industries due to the small number of sample size (86 respondents) and it was only one 
company studied. 
 
Implications: Business continuity is very important to both buyers and suppliers. Knowing 
the factors that promote continuity is very crucial in decision making. Theoretically, this 
study will contribute in both RCT and TCA theories as well as their intgration effects. 
 
Key words: Long-term Orientation, Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction Cost 
Analysis, Buyer-Specific Investment, Supplier-Specific Investment, Superdoll Trailer 
Manufacturing Co. Ltd, Performance Satisfaction and Relationship Duration 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides the background to this study, research problem, objectives of this 
study and research questions that the study is seeking out to answer; significance of this 
research to the company studied, other companies, researchers and academicians; and lastly 
the chapter presents how the remainder of the study will be organized. 
 
1.2 Background Information 
Taken from the buyers’ perspective, quality relationships study has apprehended a great 
attention from different scholars (Bejou, Wray, and Ingram 1996, Sheth and Sharma 1997, 
Walter et al. 2003). Building on the definition of quality dimension (Dwyer, Shurr, and Oh 
1987, Crosby, Evance, and Cowles 1990), satisfaction, trust and less opportunism were 
identified by buyers as the meaning of quality. In addition to that, (Scheer, Kumar., and 
Steenkamp 1995), suggest that relationship quality can be defined, as perceived by buyer, to 
include the level of conflicts, commitment, long-term investment to the relationship and 
expectation of future business. Many customers recently develop long term relationship with 
their key suppliers to ensure sustainable competitive advantage (Ganesan 1994, Ryu, Park, 
and Min 2007). Although it has seen that long term relationships between buyer and seller 
can build a strong competitive advantege, (Ganesan 1994) suggest that inadequate 
understanding of time horizon can lead customers to develop long-term relationship with a 
supplier where spot marketing is more suitable. For an interfirm relationship to successed, 
parties to a relationship required to attain a long term orientation of business perspective in 
order to enjoy the benefits created from the relationship (Ryu, Park, and Min 2007).  
 
Based on social root on Relational Contacting Theory (RCT), at the core of relational 
marketing perspective are the expectations about exchange behavior shared by exchange 
partners— the so-called relational social norms (MacNeil 1978, 1980). Relational norms 
serve to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable behavior among exchange partners 
(MacNeil 1980, 1983). Thus, partners under relationship marketing arrangements attain their 
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individual goals through joint accomplishments while the expected long-term benefits of the 
relationship serve to restrain partners’ potential opportunistic behavior (Heide 1994). That 
way, relational norms help to take care of the loopholes in formal contracts entered between 
exchange partners (Lusch and Brown 1996).  
 
Transaction Cost Theory (TCA) can be used to explain the basis of governance structure as 
far as relationship is concerned as well as economic benefit gained from minimal 
transactions. In supplier selection appraisal, transaction costs are incurred and developing a 
long-term relationship with the supplier is considered to be one of the ways to reduce 
transaction cost by the buying firm and bring about firm’s financial performance 
satisfaction. 
 
Different industries have been started to wake up and try to implement supplier 
consolidation models especially in the side of cost reduction by developing close 
relationship with suppliers to create value for customers (Sethu 2016). To meet the end 
customer need, cooperation between members of supply chain is required for mutual benefit. 
As long as relationship between suppliers and buyers is concerned, there is a need for 
governance structure in all form of contractual agreement to manage potential suppliers. In 
a long term perspective, when relational norms are developed, the monitoring level is 
reduced as well as opportunistic behaviour and hence, the high level of relationship quality 
is attained. Although relational contracting and hybrid governance seen as the alternative to 
sport marketing when there is repeated purchasing, they require different implementation 
strategies depending on interorganization relationships that prevail (Heide 1994).  
 
1.3 Research Problem 
As a key to reduce transaction cost, long term business orientation has become more 
preferable when it comes to developing relationships between firms (Sheth and Sharma 
1997). Resilient relationships with few selected set of suppliers has seen one way to reduce 
procurement cost and improve quality service. In previous study on vendor stratification 
(Swanson, Dorsh., and Kelley 1998) it has been arguing that many organizations have start 
to recognize the importance of different suppliers and establish long term sustainable 
relationships that will lead to competitive business strategies. In B2B business settings, 
customers have recognised that suppliers can generate significance profit in their business 
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operation (Wilson 1995) and thus governance norms in developing a long term relationship 
can be thought in such a way it will help a firm to reduce the level of opportunism (Seggie, 
Griffith., and Jap 2013) and increase commitment for the future business. 
 
Supply chain management has been highly studied as it offers a lot of advantage in business, 
like flexibility, low cost, business competitiveness and high quality. To gain from these 
advantages, buyers and sellers found themselves form different kind of relationships 
according to their purchasing portfolio (Olsen and Ellram 1997). It argues that, if buyers 
perceive quality performance over time, there is a chance of long-term relationship 
development between buyer and seller and thus ensure seller of a prospective business 
(Gummesson 1987). The interest in this paper is to investigate what are the factors that might 
lead to a long-term orientation in buyer-supplier business relationship. 
 
Organisational buying behaviour is taking a new change of patterns where developing 
relationship between members of supply chains is of paramount as suggested by (Sheth and 
Sharma 1997). In their findings, they conclude that, this move will change how firms interact 
with each other and the rapid movement from less cooperation to high level of cooperation 
and partnership between firms. It is crucial to consider variety of factors when selecting 
potential suppliers (Swanson, Dorsh., and Kelley 1998). However it is quiet important to put 
the same effort to develop a long term relationship with suppliers. As such, an interesting 
question is what are the factors determine the long term orientation of the relationship which 
will have positive business impact over a long period of time. In this paper, we suggest that 
opportunism hinder the future business expextation (Wathne and Heide 2000) and thus the 
affected partner is likely to terminate the contract within short time. In addition to that, this 
paper also argue that transaction specific investment is expected to reduce opportunistic 
behaviour under symetrical investment (Buvik and Reve 2001) as well as foster the long 
term business ties under asymentrical deployment with the development of trust and 
flexibility over substantial period of time (Yaqub 2009). Similarly,  buyers are willing to 
develop long term relationship with suppliers who perform accordingly.  
 
As argued by (Sheth and Sharma 1997), supplier performance has a great chance of 
increasing buyer’s competitive advantage in the market. Therefore, this paper suggest that 
both delivery, quality and financial performance are crucial ingredients for the long term 
perspective in buyer-supplier relationship (Powers and Reagan 2007, Cannon et al. 2010, 
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Carr and Pearson 1999). In alignment with that, it is the right time to examine more on what 
determine the long term business orientation between firms in the context of buyer-supplier 
relationship.  
 
In light with the abovementioned problems, this study will explore factors to long term 
business orientation in interfirm relationships by answering the following research question: 
1. What factors influence the long-term orientation in buyer-supplier relationship? 
2. What is the role of supplier flexibility in promoting supplier-specific investment in 
the determination of  long-term business orientation?  
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
This research purposely seek out to find the factors which lead to the long term orientation 
in buyer-supplier relationship by studying the relationship between the Superdoll Trailer 
Manufacture Co. Ltd in Tanzania with its customers. Additionally, this study examined the 
moderating role of trust in making specific investment in the business relationship for the 
long-term orientation. 
Furthermore, the study investigates whether seller’s performance satisfactions and 
transaction-specific investment (from both buyer and seller) have an influence in 
determining long-term orientation in business. Also the effect of opportunism in buyer-
supplier relationship toward the continuity of business was examined in this study. 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
Buying firms have been trying to find different strategies to minimize cost and maximize 
benefit for themselves and the end customers they serve without making consideration on 
the long-term business orientation relationships impacts in their business. Long-term 
business orientation relationships in supply chain has been studied by few scholars (Heide 
and Miner 1992, Dyer and Chu 2000, Sohn 1994, Granovetter 1985) argued that coperation 
and trust between exchange partner over time may lead to the contunuity of business for a 
long time. Relationship is expected to develop over a span of time and moving from spot 
marketing entails firms to the exchange to put the governance system in place to handle the 
coordination and implementation of plan because development of relationship will rise 
opportunistic behavior to a more powerful member especially where specific asset exist 
(Buvik and Halskau 2001, Heide 1994). However, the theory of relational contracting (RCT) 
suggest that, having relationship over certain period of time lead to a development of trust, 
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social norms and personal relationship that may guide the business relationship and reduce 
the reliance of contractual terms and conditions (MacNeil 1978, 1980). Although it takes 
time for trust to develop, (Granovetter 1985, Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995) suggested that, 
trust developed through social interaction and relational norms are important in long run to 
reduce opportunism, transaction cost and level of monitoring between partners. As argued 
by (Bensaou and Anderson 1999), the higher the trust over long time the higher the 
willingness of partners to invest in specific investment and hence reduce the need for 
contractual agreement or vertical intergration as a means of safeguarding specific 
investment. 
 
Through this study, buying firms are expected to develop the knowledge of long-term 
business orientation and its importance in thier relationship with suppliers for sustainable 
development. Buying firms will understand what determines the long term business 
orientation, and thus, good supplier selection model can be achieved for long run 
achievement. Being the market leader in the country, also Superdoll Trailer Manufacture 
Co. Ltd as a supplier to many customers is eager to navigate ways for promoting future 
business with its customers and, therefore, rise the interest of this study on factors toward 
long-term orientation in buyer-supplier relationship. 
 
1.6 Structure and Organization of the Study 
This study comprises of nine chapters. The first chapter  illuminates a  background 
introduction to buyer-supplier relationship long term orientation, research problme, research 
objectives and significance of the study. Chapter 2 gives the explanation of the company by 
providing its description, products and services, supply chain, competition and the relevance 
of the company as a research setting. Chapter three provides a theoretical review of 
Transaction Cost Theory and Relational Contracting theory. These theories are used in this 
study as the main theoretical framework that are appropriate to the study to analysize the 
relationship between variables to our objectives as well as develop study conceptual model. 
Chapter 4 presents the research conceptual model and hypotheses of the study which are 
developed in the light of theories presented in chapter 3. Chapter 5 describes study 
methodology which includes research design and data collection procedure. Chapter 6 
presents the measurement development process and operationalization of variables. Chapter 
7 presents measurement assessment model and data validation process. Chapter 8 present 
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the regression model for this study. Chapter 9 presents the summary, discussion and findings 
of the study. Futhermore, it provides the implication of the study, limitation and direction of 
future studies.  
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                                               CHAPTER 2 
                                        COMPANY INFORMATION 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a detailed overview of Superdoll Trailer Manufacture Co. Ltd. The 
information about company’s background information, products, services, operations, sales 
and distribution, supply chain and competition are described in this section. The chapter also 
explains reasons why the company has choosen as a research setting for this study. The 
customer focus is due to the fact that competition among automobile companies is high, 
therefore, having customer for a long time assure the supplier of business continuity.  
2.2  Company Description and Background 
Being established in 1992, Superdoll Trailer Manufacture Co. Ltd has been one of the sole 
distributor in Central and East Africa of big automobile companies in the world for over two 
decades. It has a licenced franchise from different companies due to its proven ability to 
provide high quality and innovative products ranging from heavy duty, light truck, 
automobile accessories to technical and transportation services. Located in the commercial 
city of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Superdoll Trailer Manufacture Co. Ltd has branches in 
Arusha and Mwanza Tanzania. It also have another headquarter in Zambia To be the best in 
the automobile industry in East and Central Africa is the Superdoll’s vision. The company 
is striving to attains its vision by having long-term relationship and collaboration with 
customers to ensure the best result with minimal cost.  
 
To ensure that its clients get the best performance, Superdoll has invest in specific assets in 
different companies. It has invested in truck service center to Oil com Tanzania, own and 
operate a fleet of oil trucks at Total oil company, invest in training its staff to equip them 
with specialized  knowledge to serve clients. In case the company introduce new product, it 
provides trainings to all of its client on how to use new product or conduct a new service. 
Additionally, Superdoll has specifically put its staff to some of the companies to ensure the 
quick response and availability of technical staff at client premises. It also has specialized 
technology like budini and telematrix to ensure safety, tracking of trucks during 
transportation and quality ensurance program to check the quality of all the products. To big 
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super dealers, Superdoll is doing the branding to their big stores in all the branches as an 
investment to stregthen their business relationship. 
2.2.1The Products 
Superdoll Trailer Manufacture Co. (T) Ltd currently offers different manufactured product 
from different suppliers and manufacturers in the automobile industry around Europe. 
Mainly it serves all types of trailer product manufactured by Emil Doll gmbh from Germany 
when it was first established since 1992. Currently, expand to include all ranges of tyres, 
forklifts, spare parts, equipments and machineries, handling machines and all types of 
vehicle accessories. These products fall into two categories, one is standardize products and 
the other category is castomized. 
  
All these products are design to endure Tanzania’s road conditions and other geographical 
features. Apart from new tyres, Superdoll offer tyres re-trade where an old tire is undergo a 
re-trade process to be re-used again. Re-trade tyres are as good as new tyres. 
2.2.2 Services 
Apart from automobile products, Superdoll also offer after sales services, technical services, 
fleet management and; transportation and logistics services. In the provision of fleet 
management services, Superdoll is partnering with Mix Telemacs which is the global 
leading company in driver safety, vehicle tracking and fleeting management solution based 
in South Africa. From this partnership, Superdoll ensure its client with effective ways to 
manage their automobile assets. Likewise, in the provision of transport and logistics 
company Superdoll is partnering with Super Star Forwarders Co. Ltd a leading company in 
logistics solution around East, Central and Southern Africa (Superdoll 2016). Due to its high 
performance and reputation in logistics services, Superdoll has been awarded long term 
contracts from some of the big companies in Tanzania like Tanzania Breweries Limited, 
Total oil company and Coca cola Kwanza Limited. 
2.3 The Company Supply and Distribution Chain 
Superdoll Trailer Manufacture Co. (T) Ltd provides its customer with the one roof 
purchasing centre for automobile products from the world’s leading manufacturers and 
suppliers of automobile goods. It has a franchasing licence from big manufacturers of trailers 
and automobile equipments to distribute products in East, Central and Southern Africa. 
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Superdoll Trailer Manufacture Co. (T) Ltd has proven to be one of the successful company 
in Tanzania because of the end user satisfaction with the best quality products and services 
the company offers. Superdoll keep minimum number of inventory according to the 
projection of yearly demand, the projection which depend on the customers’ contract, 
customers business trend and world business trend of big customers’ industry.  
 
Purchasing of product is normally done when customer places an order, the purchased order 
is sent to a manufacturer or suppliers to ship the products within specified lead time. 
Delivery performance has been a challenge to Superdoll because all the products are 
purchased from Europe, and thus meeting customer’s delivery time has been a difficult task. 
This is partly because Superdoll ensure the client to deliver a product within lead time just 
to make business but in reality products are most of the time deliver beyong lead time. 
 
Figure 2. 1: Superdoll’s Distribution Channel 
 
Source: Own formulation from Company’s information 
 
 Suppliers 
Superdoll has a network of best manufacturer and suppliers in the world like Emil Doll gmbh 
from Germany, Michelin Tyres and BF Goodrich from France and Heli from China. Others 
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are Varta, Optima Batteries, Mix Telematics, GB Pouer, VBG, Combijet, Continental 
Contitech, Jost, Hyva, Wabco, Textar, Hella, Mann Filter and Fini. Superdoll enters into a 
contracts with this supply to supply their products in East, Central and Southern Africa. 
Manufacturers and suppliers ensure that Superdoll is eligible to maintain the quality of the 
products. In their contracts, these suppliers and manufacturers offer routinely trainings to 
Superdoll staff to ensure that end customers are served in satisfactory way.  
 
 Customers 
Serving both Central and East Africa automobile market, Superdoll has large network of 
dealers. The downstream supply chain contains network of super dealers, medium-small 
dealers who buy from super dealers and end customer which are both companies and 
individuals. Other big customers (companies) which comprise of big proportion of superdoll 
brands customers buy directly from superdoll while individual customers and retailer shops 
buy from large or medium dealers in Tanzania, Superdoll has more than fifty network of 
dealers throughout amd outside the country. Superdoll serve customer from different 
industry like mining, agriculture, construction, transportation and other manufacturing 
firms. Other big companies invest with Superdoll in specialized techonoly and equipment as 
mention above. Superstar Forwarders (Total oil company) has invested in Telematrix1 
technology; TBL, Swissport, Cocacola Kwanza ltd and Mt. Meru in Budini2 technology 
purchased from Brazil.  
 
 Sales Process and Payment Terms 
After receiving an order, Superdoll forward the order to the respective manufacturer or 
supplier and get the invoice to pay. The same goes to Superdoll customers, for those who 
have no contract they write a purchase order and get an invoice for payment but for those 
who have contract, they pay according to the payment terms agreed in the contract. Payment 
is mostly done with foreign currency especially Us Dollar or pound but if the customer wants 
to pay in Tanzanian shilling Superdoll issue the exchange rate. 
Superdoll has customers who fall under credit sales category and who pay in cash. For all 
new client who purchase from Superdoll less that a year or those customers who order very 
unique product pay in cash the invoiced amount or a certain percentage as advance payment. 
                                                 
1 Customised tracking and safety assurance technology mainly used for oil companies 
2 Specialized technology for tyres quality assurance 
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The rest of the customer depending on customer’s company assets, business trend and 
relationship duration with superdoll pay within sixty or ninety days (credit-sales). 
 Challenges in the Market 
Being in the market for a long time makes Superdoll to have a reputation and earn trust from 
most automobiles companies especially government institutions. It also has a reputation of 
selling its products at very high price but many companies still prefer Superdoll products 
due to its quality. The delivery time is still a challenge because Superdoll does not keep very 
large number of inventory due to high variety customers. All the products are ordered from 
European countries, this means that longer lead times are required but Superdoll often time 
make false promises to its clients about delivery time in order not to lose the to competitors. 
 
Another big challenge facing Superdoll now in the market is Chinese products with low 
price range (approximately more that a half of Superdoll’s price) and light materials 
especially trailers. Superdoll’s trailers are made up of heavy components which make the 
trucks to carry less amount of goods to reach the maximum required weight when passing 
weight bridge compared to those from China which are made up of lighter materials. 
Currently, ecomonic and political situation now in the country poss a great threats to 
Superdoll as many construction, containers dry ports and logistics companies are closing 
down. 
 
 Competitors 
Superdoll face competition from both tyres, trailers and other automobile manufacturing 
companies who imports products in Tanzania. The biggest cometitors are Usangu logistics 
Co., Simba trailers, AM trailers, Nas, Good year, Ozgul trailers and BS tires. Superdoll’s 
competitors are becoming more aggressive. Formally, Superdoll was the leading in the 
market share of tyres and trailers market. Presently, NAS which supply tyres from China 
and India has 45% of market share while Superdoll has 20%. Ozgul Trailers is another 
biggest Superdoll competitor with 30% market share in trailer market while Superdoll has 
20%. One of the big reason for this is the price of the products. Competitors sell their 
products at a cheap price which is more that a half of Superdoll price. 
 
The quality of Superdoll’s products and reputation in performance makes it to have the 
largest second market share with other competitors holding less that 15% market share. In 
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the building strategy to restore and increase market share, Superdoll is offering more 
flexibility in credit limit and entering into long-term contracts with its customers. 
 
2.4 Significance of Superdoll Trailer Manufacture Co. (T) Ltd as a 
Research Setting 
Loosing market share to competitors has been a wake up call to Superdoll Trailer 
Manufacturing Co. (T) Ltd. Different researches have been conducted in past few years to 
determine what are the real causes of this situation. Representatives of manufacturers and 
suppliers have conducted number of training on sales and marketing. Technical staff have 
gone to Europe for trainings and education. All these have been done to win the competition 
and increase market share in the long run. 
 
As number of competitors increases, customers power over suppliers increase as they can 
move to different suppliers. Chinese market is increasing all over the world especially in 
African market.  Building a loyal customer base has been a challenge to many companies 
not only Superdoll. In this case, Superdoll has been looking for ways to maintain its 
customers and bring in new customers. Based on previous studies on buyer-supplier 
relationship, long-term orientation seems to serve this purpose. According to different 
number of studies, suppliers are seeking to develop long-term business orientation that will 
bring mutual benefit for a long time. Therefore, Superdoll in this regard rationalises being 
the research setting for this study. Findings will not only help Superdoll but also other 
companies in different industries. 
 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented information about the company by giving detailed explanations 
of the company’s background, distribution channel, products,services,sales and competition. 
The supply chain has also been presented to show the position of Superdoll as a focal firm 
in the supply chain and the dow stream distribution of products and services. Reasons of 
why Superdoll was choosen as the research setting were also described in this chapter, and 
thus the result of this findings will help other companies too. The next chapter will present 
the theoretical foundation of the research hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction  
Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) and Relational Contracting Theory (RCT) are presented 
in this chapter. The conceptual model of this study are developed from these theories. The 
act of searching self interest with guile (opportunism) by one party in a relationship lead the 
other party to terminate the relationship hence the relationship is shorten. On the other hand, 
the investment of specific asset by buyer is likely to lengthen the long-term orientation with 
the seller because the buyer is confidence enough to gain the net value of his investment 
from the relationship. Likewise, the specific investment by the seller increase th confidence 
and commitment of a buyer in that relationship. Relational norm of flexibility in the 
existance of asset specificity increase the trust and assurance of seller commitment in the 
relationship and therefore, there is a greater posibility for a buyer to elongate the relationship 
for a long time.Building on the perspective of these theories, the study hypotheses are 
derived from TCA and RCT theories. 
 
3.2 Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) 
Rooted from institutional study of economics, transaction cost is a multidisciplinary concept 
growing its roots in other field such as, organization management, law, industrial marketing 
and political science. As firms in industrial marketing seek to reduce costs associated with 
transaction of repeated purchases in the market, contracts seen as a way to enable the 
exchange (Williamson 1979). Knowing that contracts are not capable of anticipating all 
future contingencies of the transaction as contrary to classical law , (MacNeil 1978) explain 
neoclassical contracting that will enable parties to resolve unplanned issues in  their long 
term contract. Increasingly duration of contract may cause partners to develop norms that 
cause the firms to rely much on relationship rather that contractual agreement and thus form 
another type of contracting, relational contracting  (MacNeil 1978, 1980)  In his earlier work 
Ronald Coase explain that, under certain circumstances the cost of making an exchange in 
the market may surpass the cost of establishing the same exchange within the firm. In such 
framework, Transaction cost was regarded to include the cost of both ex ante and ex post of 
market for a particular product (Rindleisch and Heide 1997).    
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In the understanding of transaction cost,  distinguishing ex ante and ex post is important. Ex 
ante cost arise when establishing contract and it includes costs of initial drafting of the 
contract, negotiation and safeguarding while on the other hand ex post include costs of 
monitoring and enforcement of contractual terms (Williamson 1985, Rindleisch and Heide 
1997). In addition to mentioned costs, TCA has said to also include the cost of managing 
relationships between partners and the cost of making poor decision (Williamson 1979, 
Williamson 1985). Accodingly,  transaction cost can take different forms according to the 
governance mechanism employed in the transactions: market or hierarchy mechanisms 
(Williamson 1985, Williamson 1979). Due to the rising of many transactions that do not fall 
on those extremes (Rindleisch and Heide 1997), the demand for the relationships governance 
studies has increased in past decades (Heide 1994, Heide and Stump 1995, Williamson 
1985). 
 
Looking at both the supplier selection process and relationship of buyer and seller, 
transaction cost of making an exchange will increase within the firm as a result of bad 
supplier selection decision and possible contractual monitoring (Williamson 1979) based 
under bounded rationality and opportunism. In his work (Williamson 1985) specified three 
dimensions of Transactions cost analysis which are asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency of transaction. In the same work, (Williamson 1985) identified behavior 
assumptions of assessing contract to include bounded rationality and opportunism. TCA 
relies much on these strong behaviour assumptions of contracting. He also added that, these 
dimension of transaction cost help in determining the governance structure (Williamson 
1985, Heide 1994). Since transaction cost take a central part in organization activities, firms 
have realized too much suppliers or buyers create the wind of uncertainty. Developing 
relationship will help to reduce uncertainty and transaction cost. On contrary, (Sheth and 
Sharma 1997) ague that, too much effort on safeguard opportunism may lead to another form 
of opportunistic behaviour. Developing relationship over a long period of time with 
suppliers may reduce control mechanism and hence increase efficiency.  
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3.2.1 Transaction Cost Behaviour Assumptions 
 Bounded Rationality 
This is one of the congnitive capability of human behaviour in which TCA relies upon. In 
this form of rationality, economic actors are assumed to be “intendedly rational, but only 
limitedly so” (Williamson 1985). This means that, in the time of making contract, human 
oftentimes like to act rationally but they are limited by lack of their ability in processing 
information. This may lead to some loopholes in the contract that cause other part to act 
opportunistically. Under environment uncertainty, this may be more challengingly because 
some of the exchange terms and performance verification cannot be developed ex ante or 
measure ex post under behaviour assumptions respectively (Rindleisch and Heide 1997, 
Williamson 1985).  
 
Governance structures may take part in recognizing and utilizing the limited competence in 
bounded rationality for mutual benefit, (Williamson 1985). In long term contract, the 
adaptation of market changes is crucial for exchange transaction and most of the contract 
terms are left vague to offer rooms for bounded rationality (Williamson 1979). Effective 
adaptation in long term relationship may be difficult as one of the part to an exchange may 
use the unstated contract term to seek individual interest (opportunism). (Williamson 1979) 
suggested that governance mechanism which may mitigate the opportunism is still necessary 
as the negotiation cost of each adaptation part will be very high and therefore ride the 
transaction cost ex post. 
 
 Opportunism  
As defined by (Williamson 1985), opportunism is the act of searching self interest with guile 
which can appear in the form of lying, stealing and cheating. This involve the act of 
providing either incomplete or distorted information in order to mislead, distort or confuse 
other party for individual gain in a relationship exchange. Opportunism can occur in 
different arrangement, first it can be in the form of both ex ante ex post. This is more 
recognized in insurance business setting where ex ante opportunism occur when insurance 
company are incapable of regconizing their clients risk while ex post occur after clients fail 
to take responsible action to alleviate risk where possible. Second form of opportunism 
appear in active form as parties breach the contract and passive form as partners avoid 
quality of products or services as agreed in the contract by withheld critical imformation 
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(Wathne and Heide 2000, Williamson 1985, Seggie, Griffith., and Jap 2013). Different 
literatures have written on different forms of opportunism to the extent that it lead to the 
misunderstanding of opportunism measures. Ambiguity in understanding the forms of 
ooportunism rise challenging situation in determining potential outcomes and alleviating 
measures of opportunism (Wathne and Heide 2000, Rindleisch and Heide 1997, John 1984, 
Murry and Heide 1998).  
 
Opportunism is one of the key factor which affect the relationship quality in a buyer-seller 
relationship. The opportunistic behaviour may be attributed by environmental uncertainty, 
ambiguity, transaction specific investment, information/power asymetry, dependency and 
time horizon (Yaqub 2009, Kang and Jindal 2015, Morgan and Hunt. 1994, Wathne and 
Heide 2000, Heide and Stump 1995). Many studies have shown that business relationships 
may start in a good way but over time the destruction may occur and relationship may 
collapse. This destruction particularly expected to occur in a closed relatioship where the 
lenghth of the relationship is determined in advance (limited time), while in contrary, being 
in a long term telationship foster cooperation between patners and offer a means to minimize 
opportunistic behavior (Anderson and Jap 2005, Gulati, Khanna, and Nohria 1994, Gulati, 
Lawrence, and Puranam 2005, Yaqub 2009). 
 
Firm performance level is largely depend upon the governace mechanism and the contractual 
reinforcement established among exchange firms (Yaqub 2009, Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan 
2007, Achrol and Gundlach 1999, Yu, Liao, and Lin 2006). Too much monitoring and 
control mechanism may lead to more bureaucratic system and high governance cost but in 
other hand too little of it may leave the firm vulnerable to opportunistic behavior (Sheth and 
Sharma 1997). For the governance to work, the governance mechanism must be 
corresponding to the firm’s ability and transaction attributes (Yaqub 2009). 
 
Based on the form of opportunism behavior as described by (Seggie, Griffith., and Jap 2013, 
Williamson 1985, Wathne and Heide 2000), passive and active opportunism can occur under 
two conditions, existing or new situations. When the firm in an exchange refuse to do as 
promised in the agreement, hiding important information, telling lies, not fulfil the 
obligations as per contract terms, fail to provide up-dates or refuse to adopt in new situations 
for its own benefit, the firm is conducting an opportunistic behavior known as passive 
opportunism (Wathne and Heide 2000, Seggie, Griffith., and Jap 2013, John 1984, 
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Williamson 1985). Active opportunism has been written by different scholars, and it occurs 
when an opoertunistic party purposely breach the contract term by violeting the contract 
term like product specification (Seggie, Griffith., and Jap 2013) without telling the truth to 
the other party for individual benefit. (Wathne and Heide 2000) present these form of 
opportunism and two situations in the figure as it is seen below, and explain that, value 
creation and wealth distribution impacts differ depending on the form of opportunistic 
behavior between exchange partners. 
 
Figure 3. 1: Opportunism Form 
 
Source: Adopted from (Wathne and Heide 2000) 
 
The above table shows the form of opportunism under existing and new circumstance. The 
outcome of each conditions is depicted in four cells and each cell is described below: 
 
Cell 1: Under existing situation, passive opportunism affect both wealth redistribution and 
value creations. In short run, the evasion of product specification will lead to cost saving to 
opportunistic party but in long term scenerio after long period of disatisfaction, the customer 
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will not purchase and hence wealth redistribution (revenue) be affected (Wathne and Heide 
2000). 
 
Cell 2: Under new circumstance, passive opportunism lead to the revenue gain to 
opportunistic party in short period due to the refusal to adapt new situations (Wathne and 
Heide 2000). However, as a result of one party refuse to change terms to respond to new 
circumstance, relationship may be may be affected and hence,  in long run, this may lead to 
opportunistic party loss revenue as a result of foregone long term benefit for short term gain. 
 
Cell 3: Active opportunism under existing condition means that one party to the exchange 
violet the contract terms. In short term the opportunistic party may gain revenue in expense 
of the victim’s increased cost of contract monitoring and safeguarding. This wealth 
redistribution from mutual revenue will lead to an opportunistic party’s revenue loss in long 
run (Wathne and Heide 2000). 
 
Cell 4: Active opportunism under new circumstance may increase direct cost of haggling 
and renogotiation cost. (Williamson 1993) stated that, the failure to gain concern from other 
party to respond to the new circumstance after negotiation may lead to opportunity cost. In 
short run the opportunistic party may have revenue gain but in the long run both parties have 
a risk of potential loss due to the failure of maladaption to new circumstance (Wathne and 
Heide 2000). 
 
In either form, the opportunism affect performance satisfaction negatively (Seggie, Griffith., 
and Jap 2013) as it creates more costs of control and managing mechanism. To ensure that 
both parties act for mutual benefit, there is information symetry and modifications are made 
with response to environment changes,  transaction cost increases as monitoring, bargaining 
and adaptation costs are increases in the relationship. The chance of buyers to terminate the 
relationship due to supplier’s opportunistic behavior is higher as the transaction cost 
increases reduces buyer’s satisfaction with the overall relationship performance (Seggie, 
Griffith., and Jap 2013). 
 
In this study opportunism will be discussed in its natural form of action of self interest with 
guile based on refusal to adopt new condition (cell 2) and loss of long run revenue due to 
the failure of maladaption to new circumstance for mutual benefit (cell 4). Opportunism in 
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this study is one of the independent variable and it will be further discussed later in the 
hypothesis development. 
 
With regard to TCA, investment in specific asset has seen as one way of reducing or 
increasing the level of tolerance toward opportunistic behavior (Wathne and Heide 2000). 
other scholars have contributed on different ways to manage and control opportunism in 
buyer-seller relationships. (Achrol and Gundlach 1999, Stump and Heide 1996, Dyer 1997, 
Heide 1994, Young and Wilkinson 1989) suggest the use of  legal contacts, (Anderson and 
Weitz 1989, Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995, Dyer 1997, Heide and John 1992, Granovetter 
1985, Noordwier, John, and Nevin 1990, MacNeil 1980, Morgan and Hunt. 1994) relational 
norms and trust mechanisms, (Williamson 1985, Rindleisch and Heide 1997) vertical 
integration adaptation, (Klein 1996, Kogut 1988, Buvik and Reve 2002) specific investment 
to the relationship, (Abreu 1988, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, Taylor 1987) game theory, 
and (Anderson and Weitz 1992, Heide and Miner 1992)by focusing on lon-term business 
perspective. 
 
3.2.2 Transaction Cost Dimensions 
Three dimensions of TCA were identified in (Williamson 1985) to explain why one 
transaction differ from the other. Those dimensions are specific asset investment, 
uncertainty and frequency of transaction. 
 
 Transaction Specific Investment 
Specific investment play a crucial role in facilitating firm’s performance (Brown, Crosno, 
and Dev 2009, Stump and Joshi 1999) and safeguarding mechanism against opportunism 
(Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003, Brown, Crosno, and Dev 2009). TSI are becoming 
common attributes of many buyer-supplier relationships as they offer special bondage due 
to its special nature dedicated to specific transaction relationship. (Williamson 1985, 1991) 
identify six type of specific assets as site, physical assets, human asset, brand name, temporal 
and dedicated specific investment. Because of their nature on being difficult to be 
redeployed in other alternative use without losing value if the relationship is terminated, they 
poss a substantial risk (Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003, Anderson and Weitz 1992) and 
thus create a lock-in situation. In contrary, the possibility for the relationship to continue 
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over long term is high when the specific asset is involved in a relationship (Williamson 
1985).  
 
Specific investments can be made by either party or both for various reason. These reasons 
include to gain access of important material of production, the usage of brand name, 
guarantee sources of supply, constant revenue or better contract terms (Stump and Joshi 
1999). Relational view of specific investment by both partners suggest the likelihood  
occurance of new transaction in the future if there is non-existance of multi-sourcing 
(Rindleisch and Heide 1997), as well as potecting each partner from opportunistic behavior 
(Buvik and Reve 2001). In the existing relationship, the level of commitment, trust, 
development of relational norms and ability of partners to adapt to new environment for the 
sake of sustaining relationship coupled with distinctive investments foster the continuity of 
relationship in long term (Bensaou and Anderson 1999). Similary (Buvik and Haugland 
2005) found out that, legal contractual agreement is substantially reduced when both 
partners invest in specific investment in a relationship that develop over time. High degree 
of involvement in past relationship may contribute to the investment in specific assets 
(Stump and Joshi 1999). 
 
Although many studies show the positive correlation between specific investment and 
opportunism, specific investment in different manner may call for opportunistic behavior by 
one partner to the other due to the fact that such investment has less value outside the 
relationship (Brown, Crosno, and Dev 2009, Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003). Regarding 
this argument, therefore,  (Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003) suggest that, the impact of 
specific investment in the relationship depend on the relationship duration and the norms 
that develop out of the trust embedded in that relationship over a substantial period of time.  
 
In the case of unilateral specific investment, development of safeguarding mechanism 
against opportunistic behavior is endorsed ex ante (Buvik and Haugland 2005). Contractual 
coordination is adopted especially by investing partner to protect its assets from 
opportunistic party. As relationship develop over time, relational norms and trust develop 
that surpus the need to rely on contractual coordination (MacNeil 1978). This may 
necessitate the governance mechanism to change responding the changes in the market. 
According to (Buvik and Haugland 2005), flexibility in governance mechanism is required 
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to allow adaptation because adjustments occur over a period of time and exchange parties 
can not negotiate ex ante as long as bounded rationality is considered. 
 
Specific asset is a commitment that has a suck cost. It needs a lot of trust to invest in a 
specialized investment in a relationship by parties. Parties are willing to invest in a specific 
asset it there is benefits out of it by both or either of the parties.  
 
In this study, buyer-specific investment is crucial to determine the long-term orientation of 
the business because if the buyers invest in a specific investments it means that they trust 
and satisfied by seller performance and, thus, willing to be in a relationship in a long-term. 
Additionally, buyer risk to invest in a specialized assets because the reward of it is greater 
than the cost in a long run. To seller’s side, investment by a buyer in specific investment 
assures the continuity of business in a long time. The reciprocal investment by a seller in a 
specific investment in a relationship increase the confidence to the buyers and, therefore, 
mutual benefits are expected in long run. Buyer-specific investment in thus study is said to 
positively influence long-term orientatio and will be explained more in the next chapter of 
hypotheses development. 
 
Additionally, may choose to invest in specific assets as a reciprocal investment or as the first 
move to motivate buyers for business continuity. In this study it has been aurgued that, 
supplier-specific investment can significantly affect business continuity at the existance of 
supplier flexibility. Therefore,  
supplier-specific investment are said to positively influence long-term orientation at the 
moderation effect of supplier flexibility and are further explained in the hypotheses 
development in chapter 4. 
 
 Uncertainty  
Generally it is an unstable condition where decision making become difficult to assume all 
possible events. Bounded rationality limit the ability to develop detailed agreement strategy 
which can foresee all possible features of transaction in advance (Williamson 1985), and 
thus, governance structures are developed to safeguard against any opportunistic behavior. 
As described by (Williamson 1985), uncertainty fall under behavior or environment 
uncertainty. Behaviour uncertainty is important in the understanding of transaction cost 
theory because it featured on opportunism from economic agent while environmental 
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uncertainty arises from changes in external environment which can not be foreseen ex ante 
and thus impact on how the transactions are structured (Williamson 1985). Due to inability 
to predict what might be the reactional behaviour of other partner in any an unticipated 
situations, firms tend to seek flexibility in an exhcnge relationship (Stump and Joshi 1999). 
The relationships that comprehend specific investments are vulnerable to uncertainty 
because the failure of adaptation to environment changes exposes the firm to specific 
investment to opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1985). Specific investment creates a lock-
in situation which is very difficult to shift to another supplier without lossing the value 
invested (high switching cot) and if the relationship continue should more investment require 
to protect the already invested capital in or call for more safeguarding mechanism for future 
events (Stump and Joshi 1999). 
 
Coping with uncertainty, different researches from transaction cost theory and relational 
norms suggest the use of governance mechanism like vertical integration and coordination 
(hierarchal governance) with the adaptation of specific assets (Buvik and John 2000, Heide 
and John 1990, Lusch and Brown 1996, Williamson 1985, Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998). 
Though, external uncertainty has a tendency to condence the length of relationship, to secure 
the source of supply buyer invest specific investment in the relationship for future purchase. 
This is not merely the case general because partners who seek continuity of business adapt 
to environment changes (flexibility), but perceived uncertainty may drive firms to invest in 
specific investment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Milliken 1987, Harrison and Kelly 2010). 
 
 Frequency of Transaction 
Frequency dimension is characterized as the activities of buyer in the market which can fall 
under one time purchase, sporadic and frequent transactions. Sporadic and frequent 
transaction is very much visible in buyer-supplier relationship and thus firms earnest develop 
governance structure that enable to maintain their relationships (Williamson 1979). The 
implications of governance strucutre to more of large repeated transaction is significance, 
the importance of which is more noticed when sustenance with investment in specialized 
asset (Williamson 1985). Repeated transaction between buyer and seller allow the 
development of social norms for which in long term govern the transactions. It shows the 
growing concern and interest between exchange partners and at the same time dipress 
opportunism. In addition, it is a favourable condition for mutual understanding and 
strenghten communication due to frequent interactions. Nonetheless, it promote the use of 
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relational norms and enhance mutual cooperation and thus reduce the need of contractual 
safeguards (Yang and Cai 2008).  
 
Partners are more willing to invest in a relationship for a long-term where the degree of 
purchasing frequency is high because the frequency of purchase have a positive 
consequences in the investment of hierachies that reduce transaction cost (Yeung, Cheng, 
and Lai 2005). Relationship between partners is strengthened as order frequency increases 
regardless of standardized or specialized  purchases though the investment of transaction 
specific investment increases and improves the coordination efforts between business 
partners as the expectation of future interaction is very high (Buvik 2000). (Heide and Miner 
1992) stressed out that, mutual coorperation is extended in the future between partners as 
frequency of order increases. Frequently ordering of standardize or specialized goods allow 
partners to interact more often, thus, increases the chance to develop business ties for a long 
time. This is also supported by sociologists and economists who argued that frequency 
transaction between partners reassure continuity of business in the future because it provides 
continous sharing of information. As time goes the partners will learn who to trust and who 
not to trust (Poppo and Zenger 2002). 
 
3.3 Relational Contracting Theory (RCT) 
Classifying contract in two types as discrete transaction and relational contract, Ian Macneil 
was able to come up with ten exchange norms; these are role integrity, reciprocity, 
implementation of planning, effectuation of consent, flexibility, solidarity, the linking norms 
(restitution, reliance and expectation interests), creation and restraint of power, propriety of 
means, and harmonization with the social matrix (MacNeil 1978, 1980). ). Discrete 
transaction involves one purchase while relational contract consists of frequency transaction 
and long-term relationships between parties (Wightman 2000). McNeil focus his work on 
the social behavior and exchange phenomenon of contracting. He also provides a clear 
distinction between discrete transaction and relation contraction by looking at the twelve 
characteristics of differences which are relationship type, measurability, sources of 
economic support, duration of relationship, termination, planning, expected future 
cooperation, benefits and liabilities, obligations fulfilment, transferability, number of 
members and member’s views (Diathesopoulos 2010).  
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Relationship of firms over time tend to shift the exchange coordination on relational 
governance more than contractual agreement (Buvik and Halskau 2001). This is highly 
attributed more when the level of specific investment and uncertainty is high. Trust is an 
important catalyst in any business exchange to take place over long period of time. When 
the relationship grows over time, firms tend to develop inform norm and rules followed by 
established trust and cooperation for future economic benefit (Heide and John 1990). 
3.3.1 Trust, Flexibility, Relationship Duration and Long term orientation 
TCA and RCT theories underline that cooperation between firms emerges through the 
development of specific relationship which deepens its roots as the partners interacts for a 
period of time. Trust and commitment between partners are important catalysts for the 
relationship to reveals its potential expectation through mutual cooperation (Heide and 
Miner 1992). Contrary to other studies of of TCA which state that cooperation in 
interorganization arrangement arises as a result of dependancy between firms (Williamson 
1985), social norms theories suggest that cooperation between firms develops through firms 
interactions, commitment and trust over an extended period of time (Heide and Miner 1992). 
Time duration of the relationship create certain norms that over time will develop personal 
relationship and trust that will likely govern the business relationship (MacNeil 1978). 
Development of relational norms require trust between partners which needs time to 
materialized in the relationship. Relational contract is adjusted over time depending on 
experience of past relationship and current situation and therefore, governance structure will 
stray from prio formal contractual agreement (Buvik and Halskau 2001, MacNeil 1978). 
 
Relational Norm of Trust  
The expectation of business continuity and investment of specific assets depends largely on 
the degree of trust between buyers and suppliers. The positive relationship between trust and 
performance satisfaction trigger the commitment of partners to the relationship hence, long 
term orientation investment (Nyaga, Whipple, and Lynch 2010). Trust is the state of 
confidence involving positive expectation in the risky environment about oneself or other 
part. It is important factor in the development of any personal or inter-firm relationship 
though (Jeffries and Reed 2000) argued that,too much or too little of it is bad for inter-
organizational relationship. Firms perceive the existing of trust when there is honesty and 
credibility. These two determinant of trust ensure the partners of less opportunistic 
behaviour in the relationship.  
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Trust is expected to develop over a certain period of time. It affects the long term orientation 
positively when partners in business believe that each party will perform its duties without 
taking advantage of other party, buyer is confidence that over a long period of time short 
term inconveniences will be resolved and transaction cost will be reduced over long term 
(Grayson 2007, Ganesan 1994) . Trust can be linked with TCA because it reduces supplier 
monitoring cost, administration cost in long term and cost related to contract drafting gap 
(opportunism). In a nut shell, trust developed in a long period influence transactional cost 
reduction through increase purchasing performance outcome and, therefore, strengthen long 
term orientation (Ryu, Park, and Min 2007). According to (Cannon et al. 2010), buyer are 
willing to enter into long-term business relationship and invest in transaction specific asset 
with suppliers they trust most in all ways. In this study trust was linked with supplier 
performance satisfaction in terms of economic performance. This means that, buyers will 
not enter into a relationship trusting that supplier will perform in the future but they will be 
confidence enough to enter into long-term orientation after a certain time when they are sure 
supplier performance is satisfactory. Buyers’ trust in supplier performance is necessary for 
long time committment.  
 
Relational Norm of Flexibility 
As firms moves from spot purchasing to other extreme of vertical integration when 
transactions increases, common relational norms of flexibility, information exchange and 
solidarity may develop (Heide and John 1992). Also the duration of relationship will 
determine how supplier will be flexible to respond buyer’s request due to the development 
of shared norms of exchange overtime (Heide and Wathne 2004). Flexibility of supplier 
towards unpredictable events build confidence and trust of the buyer which enhance the 
chance for future businesses (Noordwier, John, and Nevin 1990). 
 
 The effort of sustaining current relationship for a long time had lead to replacement of 
contractual governance to more of relational governance. This has been facilitated by parties 
being flexible to adjust contractual terms to adapt the changing environment. From the 
buyers’ perspective, supplier flexibility offers assurance that, the adjustment of contractual 
term by the supplier due to the changed circumstances or unforseen event is for the well-
bing of relationship and mutual benefit (Heide and John 1992). In this perspective, buyers 
are likely to remain in the relationship for along time. The effect of supplier flexibility is 
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more significant in the existance of supplier specific investment as explained later in the 
chapter 4. 
 
Relationship Duration  
Duration of the relationship has impact on the flexibility, trust and development of relational 
norms (Anderson and Weitz 1989). (Samouel 2007) found out that relational norms as 
perceived by buyer and seller are developed as duration of relationship increases. This is 
because as partners are involved in a relationship for a long time social and cultural distance 
is reduces and mutual commitment is development with less self interest. 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, Transaction Cost Analysis and Relational Contracting Theory were discussed 
as relevant theories to this study. Under TCA, any economic exchange is bounded rationale 
thus causing other part to act opportunistically when circumstances change. Also investing 
in specific asset is suggested to create ex-post opportunism when done by one part but it can 
be used to mitigate opportunism when done by both parties. The RCT suggests that, when 
parties to a business have been in a business relationship for a long time they tend to develop 
relational norms which may act as safeguarding mechanism against any opportunistic 
behavior. In this course, mutual trust is developed and partners are confident that in long run 
mutual benefit will be realized. Following this chapter is chapter 4 which presents the 
conceptual model and hypotheses to be tested empirically.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview and development of research hypotheses based on 
theoretical foundation built in previous chapter. Figure 4.1 presented in this chapter shows 
the study research model with five independent variables, dependent variable and two 
control variables. Four variables (Supplier performance, Buyer-specific investment, 
supplier-specific investment and flexibility) positively influence the long-term orientation 
while opportunism lead to a negative association as argued by different literatures. The 
research model also has an interaction effect as depicted in the figure 4.1 
 
4.2 Research Model Overview 
Research model developed in this study seek out to investigate factors toward long-term 
orientation in buyer-seller relationship between Superdoll Trailer Manufacture Co. (T) Ltd 
(seller) and its clients. This study empirically test how Opportunism (OPPORT), supplier 
performance satisfaction (PERFORM), buyer specific-investment (BUYSPECINV), 
supplier specific-investment (SUPSPECINV) and flexibility (FLEX) as independent 
variables affect the dependent variable long-term orientation (LTO). 
 
As indicated in the figure 4.1, long-term orientation is negatively affected by opportunism 
(H1). This hypothesis suggests that, opportunistic behaviour from either party will make the 
affected party to terminate the relationship and so the long-term orientation of the business 
relationship will be shorten. However, buyer are likely to enter into a long-term relationship 
with the supplier if the performance of that supplier is very satisfactory. This means that 
supplier meets all buyers’ requirement in a satisfactory way as indicated by direct effect of 
hypothesis (H2). Likewise, hypothesis (H3) presents the positive effect between buyer-
specific investment and long-term orientation. This follow the transaction cost economics 
theory that specific investment tend to create a lock-in effect and bind the parties to a 
relationship for a long time because the termination of that relationship increase sunk cost. 
This unilateral buyer specific investment on supplier is strongly affect the determination of 
long run relationship seeking by supplier. Investment by buyer shows that buyer trust the 
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supplier to invest in a specific assets for future business gain, the commitment that will lead 
to mutual benefit in a long run. On the other hand, supplier-specific investment in this study 
is said to affect long-term orientation positively with the increase of supplier flexibility as 
proposed by hypothesis (H4). 
 
When the relationship exist for a long time, relational norms based on trust developed 
between parties that tend to govern the relationship. Relying on non-formal contracting 
depend strongly on the time that buyer and seller have been in a relationship (Duration of 
Relationship). Thus, control variables of this study is relationship duration and purchase 
volume  which have positive effects on long-term orientation. 
 
Figure 4. 1: Conceptual Research Model 
 
 
Source: Own development based on literature review 
 
4.3 Research Hypotheses 
Research hypotheses of this study were developed based on long-term relationship studies 
between buyer and seller. Furthermore, Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) and Relational 
 29 
Contracting Theory (RCT) theories were used to develop relationship between variables to 
perform an empirical test of this research. 
 
4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
Long-term Orientation 
Any effective buyer-supplier relationships require trust, commitment in the long-term 
business orientation for partners’ benefits. Recently, buyer-supplier relationship has been a 
central focus in marketing and supply chain management studies (Cannon et al. 2010). 
Business actioners have started to realize that being in collaboration with their suppliers has 
benefit in short term and long term in both monetary form and competitive advantages in 
the market. In the presence of performance satisfaction, members to a business are willingly 
to develop and maintain a relationship for a long time. In the same way, satisfaction occur 
when partners have been together in a relationship over a long period of time enough to 
enable partners to measure the level of performance between each other (Powers and Reagan 
2007).  
 
As defined by (Noordwier, John, and Nevin 1990), Long term orientation build upon 
relational transaction as a result of repeated purchases. Probability of relationship continuity 
drive partners to a relationship to think about having long term business orientation. As a 
firm think of future business interaction with its business partner with no defined end point, 
the continuity of business over a long period of time is expected. Interorganizational 
business relationship is expected to continue in the future if the expectation between partner 
is strongly influenced by factors like performance of the relationship, resource dependency, 
investment of specific asset, reputation and trust (Heide and Miner 1992). Additionally, 
(Ganesan 1994) defined long term orientation as the desire and utility of a buyer to adopt 
long term relationship with a supplier. He further suggests that; the duration of the existing 
relationship is not alone sufficient enough to explain this desire and intention rather than a 
necessary indicator.  
 
Building in the conceptualization definition of long term orientation from (Ganesan 1994, 
Morgan and Hunt. 1994), commitment and trust are two dimension of long term orientation 
in the realization of both individual and joint benefit in long run. Relational bondage is likely 
to create a friendship atmosphere between buyer and seller in long term scenario with the 
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prior definition of roles and responsibility (Wilson 1995, Heide and Wathne 2006). Firm in 
long term orientation perspective are willing to sacrifice current short run benefit for the 
sustainable long run mutual benefit (Anderson and Weitz 1992). Long term orientation 
incorporate  both parties join forces to solve problems in a manner that it will enhance higher 
performance over a long period of time (Cannon et al. 2010). Continuity of relationship is 
expected between firms in a long term orientation influenced by performance outcome over 
a long period of time.  
 
Long term orientation hinge on the perception of members on the probability that business 
relationship will last over time. Different factors has been identified by long term orientation 
scholars to determine the continuity of business relationship between partners (Anderson 
and Weitz 1989, Ryu, Park, and Min 2007, Cannon et al. 2010, Le Tuong and Vo Hong 
2014, Ryu 2005). Among all factors trust has been identified to be the most crucial to 
determine the long term orientation. It require trust of both parties to develop mutual 
dependence that will yield long term benefit in a long run. In the case of monopoly or power 
imbalace (resource imbalance), long term may be establish because of the lack of alternative 
sources of supply which make buyers vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour but the 
relationship is likely to be terminated when other sources of supply are available (Anderson 
and Weitz 1989).  
 
The level of effort that is devoted in the relationship depend largely on the amoun t of stake 
presented in the relationship. Firms are willing to put much of the effort in the relationship 
that has alot in stake and therefore increases the probability of business continuity. Other 
suppliers in the supply chain has reputation that make buyer to increase the likelihood of 
doing business with them in long run. This reputation may comes in the form of product 
quality, trust, competitive price, delivery, flexibility or all together (Anderson and Weitz 
1989). 
 
4.3.2 Hypotheses 
4.3.2.1 The Association between Opportunism and Long-term Orientation (H1) 
The study of Transaction cost is based upon the concept of opportunism. For any economic 
activity that involve specific asset, high level of uncertainty and frequency of transaction, 
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opportunism is critical problem (Williamson 1979). The incompleteness of contract due to 
the assumption of bounded rationality has cause firm to act opportunistically. In his 
conclusion, (Williamson 1979) said that, in reducing opportunism, consideration must be 
emphasized during contract arrangement and opportunism must be controlled in effective 
way which is cost consciousness, otherwise it might lead to another form of opportunistic 
behaviour it tries to defend as suggested by (Sheth and Sharma 1997, Wuyts and Geyskens 
2005). In (Williamson 1993) opportunism is defined as “self-interest seeking with guile”. If 
opportunism in a buyer-seller relationship is high, much effort and resources may be 
advocated in controlling and monitoring and thus, high opportunity cost (Wathne and Heide 
2000). In this case the long-term orientation will be negatively affected. Recent study has 
suggested that, relational norms and joint problem solving is a better way of cutting down 
opportunism and increase quality of relationship in buyer-seller relationship for future 
continuity of business in long term because relational norms develop with trust that partner 
will jointly act for mutual benefit. 
 
Opportunism may also appear when parties to a relationship fail to define the time prospect 
of their relationship. Defined time bound of the relationship expose the business relationship 
to ex-post opportunism while literatures suggest that prior undecided of the length of time 
may protect firms against opportunistic behaviour and improve collaboration between 
partners for mutual benefit (Yaqub 2009). Being in a relationship for a long time reduces  
uncertainty which is one factor for opportunism. Partners who act opportunistically pursue 
short terms self interest benefit in the expense of long term mutual goals (Yaqub 2009). 
Additionally, as suggested by therories of TCA and RCT, continuity of relationship over an 
extended period of time may develop relational norms and trust that may complement or 
substitute prior contractual agreement, the situation that may act as safeguarding against 
oportunistic bahaviour (Poppo and Zenger 2002).  
 
Supplier may use unplanned situation opportunistical to gain extra revenue from a buyer. 
This happen when a seller refuse to change its term according to a new situation for a short 
term gain, the result of which buyer terminate the contract and future business is 
compromised (Wathne and Heide 2000). Moreover, a seller may actively act 
opportunistically by failure to adopt to new circumstance after an axtensive renogotiation. 
This renogotiation increase unexpected cost to buyer and the failure will lead to high 
opportunity cost (Wathne and Heide 2000). The elasticity of a supplier to adopt to new 
 32 
environment without taking the advantage of the situation for individual short term gain may 
result in a long term mutual benefit and, hence, long term relationship. This theoretical 
discussion lead to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Opportunism is negatively associated with long-term orientation 
 
4.3.2.2 The Association between Performance Satisfaction and Long-term 
Orientation (H2) 
Trust and commitment are the key factors in maintaining long term relationship influenced 
by fundamental performance in a relationship. Performance satisfaction attained after 
members to a relationship satisfied by business value delivered in a business relationship 
(Gruen, Summers., and Acito. 2000). Being in a relationship with a supplier for a long time 
can enable a buyer to observe the performance satisfaction of the relationship and thus create 
a bond for a long term orientation perspective (Powers and Reagan 2007). Several studies 
have shown the positive link between strategic purchasing and performance satisfaction of 
the firm. (Carr and Pearson 1999) confirm that, long term relationships with key suppliers 
have a positive impact on the firm’s financial outcomes provided that effort are focused on 
strategic supplier selection. Cost of negotiating, implementing, coordinating and monitoring 
add up to the transaction cost and thus, careful supplier selection to long-term relationship 
will reduce transaction cost and increase financial performance of the firm. (Spekman 1985) 
stated that, knowing suppliers’ strength and weakness over a period of time will enable a 
firm to better manage the relationship. This necessitate proper evaluation of key potential 
suppliers. 
 
Buyer’s interest in remaining in the relationship with a supplier in long run is largely 
influenced by the trust they developed about performance of the supplier (Nyaga, Whipple, 
and Lynch 2010). Long-term commitment result after buyers trust their supplier to perform 
accordingly. This decision comes after buyers and suppliers have been in a relationship for 
a time that will prove the reliability of supplier performance. Supplier performance will build 
a trust to buyers that they can commit for long-term business relationship. In measuring the 
performance of the suppliers, buyer consider relative price performance (purchase price, 
total cost of ownership and terms of sale), product/service performance and delivery 
performance (Cannon et al. 2010, Cannon and Doney. 1997, Monczka et al. 1998). Price 
performance of the seller is very important consideration in the long term orientation for the 
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buying firm because it has great impact to the buyer’s price competitive advantage and 
profitability in the market. It has been found price to be the main reason for many buyers to 
shift to another supplier (Wathne, Heide., and Biong. 2001). Likewise, product and delivery 
performance are also important in firm’s competitive advantage as it may depend on the 
reliability, usage, easy maintenance and fast delivery in addition to price advantage.  
 
The kind of relationship that a buyer is developed with a supplier has potential for 
competitive advantage (Sheth and Sharma 1997). This is due to the fact that, long term 
relationship with supplier may bring both cost benefit and revenue benefit as long as 
transaction cost and coordination is involved. Cost benefit arise from the cost saving as a 
result of long-term relationship and revenue benefit are that income generated from the 
jointly problem solving with the key suppliers (Sheth and Sharma 1997), otherwise, in the 
situation of many sellers and low switching cost buyer may move to another seller (Buvik 
and Halskau 2001, Carr and Pearson 1999, Caniels and Gelderman 2007). This study 
propose that, 
H2: Performance Satisfaction is positively related with the long-term orientation 
 
4.3.2.3 The Association between Buyer-Specific Investment, and Long-term 
Orientation 
This is an investment that is dedicated to a specific relationship that have no or less value 
outside that particular relationship. The deployment of it mark the shift of governance 
structure as the investing firm expose its asset at risk because it can not be re-deployed in 
other purposes whitout lossing its productive value. Specific investment creates 
interorganization dependence as number of firms reduced to small number condition (Buvik 
and Reve 2001). When the investment is done by one part, over a long run there is strong 
need for contractual safeguarding against opportunistic behaviour as other part may try to 
renogotiate the contract opportunistically when any unpredictable event occur but under 
mutual deployment, continuity of relationship may reduce the contractual governace by 
creating “self enforcing contracts” by both parties under the existance of trust and social 
norms (Buvik and Haugland 2005, Yaqub 2009). 
 
In case the relationship is ended as a result of opportunism, the value of transaction specific 
asset is reduced significantly. Therefore, high transaction specific investment creates the 
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problem of ex-post opportunism which may lead to contract termination within a short time 
(Gurcaylilar 2013). However, investing in specific investment may create a barrier for 
parties to exit the relationship and, thus, form a bond of togetherness for a long time. This is 
attributed by relational norms and trust that developed in a relationship after partners doing 
business for a long time (Ganesan 1994). Partners investment in specific assets is said to 
positively increases the prospects of business continuity for a long time as well as the level 
of trust. Time duration of relationship will depend on the ability of investing partner to 
safeguarding its specific investment under different changing environment. Trust, on the 
other hand can facilitate the adaptation to uncertainity by reducing the opportunistic 
behavior to the other part (Suh and Kwon 2006).  
 
In a long time, investing in a specific assets show that parties in a relationship develop a 
trust that, contract incompleteness may not be taken advantage of, and, parties will adapt to 
changes for mutual benefit (Anderson and Weitz 1989). Buyer-specific investement has 
been studied by (Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003) to affect long time relationship with a 
seller. In their study, it has been argued that, given the seller is receiving significant benefit 
over a long time from this specialized asset by a buyer, seller will unlikely act 
opportunistically to cause the termination of the contract. This situation of unilateral 
investment will create self enforcing governance mechanism given that a seller is the one 
striving to have buyers over a long time within a stiff busines competition. Because the 
specific assets have low or no value outside the relationship, buyer will invest in asset 
specificity if the net pay-off of that relationship in long run is high (Rokkan, Heide, and 
Wathne 2003). 
 
This also has been illustrated in a game theoretic studies to reflect the fact that buyer specific 
investment will create opportunistic behaviour by the supplier where short term benefit is 
significant to seller, while in the other hand if long term orientation by the seller is thought 
to reap potential benefit from the relationship with this buyer, specific investment will deter 
opportunism (Axelrod 1984, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). In buyer-seller relationship, the 
expectation of future profit in a long run time horizon will by itself serve as safeguarding 
mechanism against opportunistic behaviour to gain from long term benefit by sucrificing 
short term gain opportunistically (Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003). In the transaction cost 
studies, buyer make specific investment under repeated purchase condition to reduce 
transaction cost over a long time period (Williamson 1979, Powers and Reagan 2007). The 
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significance of buyer-specific investment depends on the future benefit expected from the 
relationship with seller. Thus, in this study i propose the following hypothesis: 
H3:Significantly increase in buyer-specific investment will positively increase the long-term 
orientation relationship 
 
4.3.2.4 Interaction Effect 
4.3.4.4.1 Supplier Specific Investment, Flexibility and Long-Term Orientation 
Supplier-specific Investment 
Suppliers will specifically invest in a relationship if they know that by doing so future 
benefits will be created, or their current situation will not deteriorate. In the situation where 
investment by supplier will create opportunistic behaviour by the buyer, supplier will engage 
in safeguarding control to protects its assets (Wagner and Bode 2014). Literatures on long-
term oriantion studies stressed out that, over a long period of time relational norms can be 
used to guide the relationship because of the trust that has been developed between 
partners(Powers and Reagan 2007, MacNeil 1980). Due to the future benefits embadded in 
the relationship with buyers, supplier make specific investment if such investments boost 
the efficiency and effectivenss toward that goal.  
 
This reciprocal commitment in specific investment by supplier will further streghten the 
relationship between buyer and supplier for a long time (Cannon and Homburg 2001, Buvik 
and Haugland 2005). Mutual investment in specific assets decrease the level of contractual 
arrangement as firms will move more on relational norms over a period of time (Buvik and 
Haugland 2005). Investing in specific asset by supplier it shows that, the supplier incurred 
this cost to show its commitment toward a long-term relationship. Over a period of time, 
supplier can adopt relational norm of flexibility and trust to sustain the continuity of 
relationship with a buyer. This will result in satisfaction increase to a buyer and, thus, 
stronger buyer-supplier relationship (Wagner and Bode 2014).  
 
Supplier flexibility 
Supplier Flexibility is when a supplier respond to buyer’s request for a change that was not 
foreseen during contract development. Buyer may request a change in product volume, 
price, place delivery or fast delivery (Noordwier, John, and Nevin 1990). Flexibility is very 
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important norm in a day-to-day business operations giving the competition of today’s 
market. Supplier firm may set rigid rules and guidelines on how to solve problems, and yet 
such rules may be used by competitors to win its customers (Dyer 1996). Being in a 
relationship for a long-time, buyer expect seller to be more flexibility to changing situation. 
Flexibility is defined by (Heide 1994) to include the willingness of a partner to accommodate 
changes in circumstance in a business relationship. Buyer may require supplier flexibility in 
different dimension of a relationship terms like price, delivery and volume (Heide and 
Wathne 2004). Thus, flexible supplier may be able to accommodate a buyer for a long time. 
 
 Flexibility foster cooperation for continuity of business. Under specific investment 
condition, supplier will be flexible to its extant relationship terms and condition if such 
action will lead to log term orientation (MacNeil 1978, Heide and Wathne 2004). The 
development of trust also contribute to the safeguarding governance mechanism for 
transaction specific investment against opportunistic behavior when there is uncertainty. It 
facilitate cooperative environment and flexibility between partners when adaptation is 
required to the changing circumstances and, therefore, decrease the chances of ex-post 
opportunism to opportunistic partner during contract renogotiations (Gurcaylilar 2013, 
Heide and John 1992). Trust depend on the relationship history between the buyer and seller 
and, therefore, so do supplier performance satisfaction and relational norm of flexibility 
(Ryu, Park, and Min 2007). 
 
Following the abovementioned aurguments, this study based on few researches done on 
specific investment and flexibility proposed that, regardless of the extent of supplier-specific 
investment, long-term orientation will be affected by the flexibility level of the supplier. The 
significance effect of supplier-specific investment on long-term orientation is largely depend 
on the responsiveness of supplier to buyers’ request. This is argumented in  the following 
figure 4.2 below. 
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Figure 4. 2: Moderating Effect of Supplier Flexibility and Supplier-specific Investment on 
Long-term Orientation 
 
Source: Own formulation from literature review 
 
Supplier flexibility moderate the effect of supplier-specific investment on long-term 
orientation as shown by figure 4.2 above. The increasing extensity of supplier-specific 
investment will lead to long-term orientation if the supplier flexibility is high as shown by 
long arrow. This is displaye in the second column where the movement of an arrow is from 
low to high supllier-specific investment under high flexibility. On the other hand, the figure 
also depict short-term orientation under low flexibility irrespective of the increasing extent 
of supplier-specific investment. The level of flexibility depend on how well supplier know 
the buyer and how long they have been in a relationship to trust each other to act in a good-
faith.  
This phenomenon in figure 4.2 is further discussed below by the matrix in figure 4.3 below. 
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Figure 4. 3: Matrix of Supplier-specific Investment, Supplier flexibility and Long-term 
Orientation 
 
Source: Own formulation from literature review 
 
Cell 1: This cell shows a situation where supplier invest highly in specific investment but its 
response to buyer’s request concerning a changing circumstance is very low. This means 
that, under a emergence state, supplier is rigid to original terms whether be price, delivary 
place or lead time.  In this situation, the probability of buyers to continue doing business 
with this supplier is very low. Within a short time of a relationship, buyer may be forced to 
go to another supplier. 
 
Cell 2: Desplays a scenario where supplier has highly invested in specific assets in a 
relationship with a buyer and his flexibility is very high. As suggested by (Heide and John 
1992), long-term relationship is significantly increased by supplier-specific investment with 
the increase with flexibility. Business continuity will be regarded by buyer if supplier is 
confidence enough to invest in specialized asset as well as flexible to adopt to new 
environment whenever happened. 
 
Cell 3: This is the state where specific investment by seller is low and its response towards 
buyer’s request of change is also very low. In situation like this continuity of business for a 
long time is not expected. The massive business competition of today’s world give a 
favourable condition for buyer to switch to another seller if switching cost is low. Therefore, 
in the long-run supplier may loose business to its competitors because buyer are willing to 
do business with flexible supplier given the changing environment of business context. 
 39 
 
Cell 4: As flexibility is very important catalyst in supplier-specific investment and long-term 
orientation, highly flexible supplier will have a greater chance to win a customer for a long 
time even if deployment of its specific asset is low (Dyer 1996). Adaptation of changing 
environment rooted from trust that developed between partners in a relationship. Higly 
flexible supplier shows that he is willing to sacrifice current revenue for future long term 
gain with a buyer. 
 
The expectation of future business interaction within the inherent context of specific 
investment will foster the flexibility norm for mutual benefit. Seeking for long time benefit, 
supplier will be able to adjust to its internal plan to accomodate the changing circumstance 
(Dyer 1996, Leshem and Tabbach 2012). This has also been attributed by (Heide and John 
1992) when they found out that the influence of supplier-specific investment on relationship 
time horizon is more visible under the existance of norm of flexibility. In this study, 
therefore, i suggest that the value of supplier-specific investment is largely depend on the 
extent of responsivensess to change by the supplier to significantly influence long-term 
relationship with a buyer.  
H3: The association between supplier-specific investment and long-term orientation is 
significantly increased with the increase of supplier flexibility. 
 
4.3.3 Control Variables 
These are other variables apart from independent variables that are included in the multiple 
regression analysis, while themselves are not causal effect but rather are sufficiently 
correlated with omitted causal factors. The method of entering these variables in the 
regression is the same as independent variables are entered though the interpretation is 
different. Control variables in this study are duration of existing relationship (DURATION) 
and buyers’ purchase volume (PURCHASES). 
 
 Duration of Relationship 
The long-term business orientation between buyer and seller is largely influenced by how 
long these parties have been in a relationship. Though may sound similar, long-term 
orientation and relationship duration are different based on the context of the subject matter 
as explained by different literatures. Prior relationship period/duration of relationship can 
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positively impact parties to a business for a long term benefit. A short relationship duration 
means that partners have not much experience about eact other for which they will excercice 
formal contorol mechanism. Non-formal relational contracting like trust, flexibility and 
reputation require  time to built up. When relationship mature,both buyer should have 
acquire enough experience, confidence enough to invest in specific investment in 
relationship for the sake of on-going long term profit.  
 
This process goes hand-in-hand with the development of trust, that parties to the relationship 
believe one partner should not act at the expenses of other partner for individual gain. When 
there is strong relational ties between parties, opportunism should be lessen to the extent that 
the governance control shift from strong contractual control mechanism to higher of 
relational norms. When the buyer is satisfied by the suppler performance, with specific asset 
invested by buyer within significant period of time, supplier can expect that the relationship 
will extend for a long time in the future. The longer the business parties has been together, 
the longer they are expexted to stay for a long time. Therefore, duration of the relationship 
is positively related to long-term orientation. 
 
 Purchase Volume 
The studies of TCA show that, as the firm increase number of transactions and volume of 
its purchase to a particular buyer, the expectation of business continuity is developed. Sport 
purchasing mark the starting point of any business. Business relationship starts to grow as 
firm’s transaction increase. Governance mechanism at this stage is necessarly to guide the 
relationship and safeguard assets against opportunistic behaviour (Heide and John 1992, 
Buvik and John 2000). When the partners involve in the relationship for a long time, 
governance mechanism slowly change as parties adapt to relational norms. 
 
Purchase volume depend on the number of transaction or the large amount of money paid 
per transaction. Recent studies have shown that, the importance of a buyer to a seller depend 
largely on volume of transaction by that buyer. Supplier invest in a specific investment or 
increase flexibility to a large buyer or a buyer who shows a prospect of growth in the future 
and therefore influence the strength of a relationship (Buvik and John 2000, Makkonen, 
Vuori, and Puranen 2016, Tanskanen and Aminoff 2015). For those campanies with low 
transaction number and purchase volume little attention is paid to them. 
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4.4 Chapter Summary 
Research model of this study has been presented in this chapter together with the discussion 
of each research hypothesis which were developed regarding long-term orientation 
literatures. Also, the in-depth development of each hypothesis show how TCA and RCT 
theories have been used to explain relationship between variables. The chapter also provide 
the discussion of both interaction effect and research control variables. In the next chapter, 
author will present the research methodology used in this research. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter present the methodological process followed in this research. Herein, research 
design and data collection method are described. Questionnaire development and key 
informant strategy are explained in this chapter to show how data were collected from 
respondents and the response rate is presented thereafter. 
5.2 Research Design 
Research design was defined by (Kothari 1990) to include data collection, measurement and 
analysis. He further explains that, research design provides a blueprint  to show what, where, 
when and how much a research study constitutes. Careful design of research must be thought 
in the beginning to examine the relationship of variables because it has great impact on how 
data will be collected and later be analysed based on the research questions formulated 
(Gupta 2003). Research design act as a road map that provide direction and procedure for 
the whole research study (Cresswell 2014). Therefore, it presents the whole outline from 
hypothesis formulation to data analysis and intepretation (Kothari 1990). As a result of this, 
researchers must come up with the research design that meets the objective and fall within 
all the possible limitation especially time and money as suggested by (Saunders, Lewis, and 
Thornhill 2009). 
 
Which type of research design to use depend on the nature of the research question (Robson 
2002). (Churchill and Brown 2004) classify research design into descriptive design which 
describe the frequency of occurring in certain relationship or association between variables 
(Kothari 1990), exploratory design which deals with exploring new ideas and causal design 
which explain the cause and effect of variables in relationship. Most of the social research  
falls under descriptive research. Furthermore, descriptive research design can either be 
longitudinal or cross-sectional research. Longitudinal research use constantly he same 
sample of population where as, cross-sectional collect data from a given sample of 
population only once (Malhotra, Birks, and Wills 2012). 
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According to (Cresswell 2014), there are three approaches to research, qualitative, 
quantitative and mixed research. Quantitative research by its simple meaning built on the 
measurement of quantity. This method includes the use of simulations and modelling to 
analyse the numerical data to test relationship among variables (Ellram and Siferd 1994). 
Also in (Cresswell 2014) this method was mentioned to include non-experimental methods 
like survey, causal-comparative research and correlational research. Quantitative research 
also involves the use of survey data and secondary data in combination with statistical 
analysis. The main approach of this study is quantitative research though qualitative research 
was used in the piloting study where phone interview with the company (Superdoll) 
representative were made to establish a research problem. Hence, the research design for 
this study is precisely cross-sectional correlational design. 
 
5.3 Questionnaire Development 
All the constructs during questionnaire development were constructed following an 
extensive literature review on buyer-seller relationship. Similar constructs were adopted 
from previous studies on long-term orientation to fit this research problem of this company. 
Additionally, skype interview were conducted as an exploratory study with one of the 
Superdoll staff and other few people in automobile parts business to gain the understand of 
the industry and to check the relevance of the constructs in Tanzania automobile business. 
The aim was to check the relevance of the developed constructs in Tanzania automobile. 
Specific assets appeared to be more of technical term to them therefore discussion of each 
constructs were conducted to make sure we were all in the same page before going deep to 
develop the measures. Other constructs like trust and flexibility were so obvious and needed 
not much explanation. Many variables were developed but examination and discussion of 
each of them reduced them to the variables contained in the questionnaire used during data 
collection. Then the questionnaire was reviewed by supervisor and his inputs were 
incorporated to obtain the final document as suggested by (DeVellis 2003). 
 
Questionnaire were developed as a survey instrument for data collection. It consist of three 
parts (see Appendix 1) where part one consists of company background information, part 
two consists of different variable constructs (multi-item) and part three consists of company 
general information to gather various information rgarding relationship between Superdoll 
Trailer Manufacturing Co. (T) Ltd and its clients. Respondednts were required to select the 
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appropriate answer that best describe the company with regard to a particular information 
using the 7-point likert scale ranging from 1- “strongly disagree” to 7-“strongly agree”. 
 
5.4 Data Collection 
This study has made use of both primary data and secondary data in testing the proposed 
research hypothesis. Primary data collection involves collecting data directly from the field 
by researcher during survey research. Secondary data on the other hand represent collecting 
data through desk reviews from published reports, websites, books and scientific journals. 
Therefore, self-administered questionnaires has been used in this research to collect primary 
data from Superdoll customers. Companies were choosen randomly from a list of Superdoll 
companies and questionnaires were distributed and adminstered in person (Churchill and 
Brown 2004). 
 
Secondary data, however played crucial role in establishing the theoretical framework and 
gain more understanding from empirical finding of the study. Secondary data collected from 
books, documents, scholarly journals, company’s report, theses and other web-based sources 
provide insight into conceptualization of research model and develop theoretical context. 
 
5.4.1 Population, Sampling Frame, Sample size and Sampling Procedure 
Sampling design in empirical study involves the identification of where primary data will 
be collected, population coverage, size of the sample and how the respondent will be selected 
(Churchill and Brown 2004). In sampling design,population defined to comprises the totality 
of cases with selected specification to fi a particular purpose (Churchill and Brown 2004). 
In regard with this study, population contains all companies that are directly served by 
Superdoll Trailer Manufacturer Tanzania. These companies are located in different location 
in Tanzania but this study give priority to those which are located in Dar es Salaam due to 
time constraints. 
 
 Sampling Frame and Sampling method 
According to (Churchill and Brown 2004), sampling frame is a list of all members of 
population that a study wishes to conduct from. Superdoll Trailer Manufacturer Tanzania 
has approximately 1000 total number of customers ranging from small retail, dealers to big 
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institutional buyers and offer different product types and services. These customers are 
distributed all over the country but for thiose companies with their manufacturing sites 
outside Dar es Salaam, they still have their main headquarter in Dar es Salaam to organize 
logistics services.The sampling frame of this study, therefore, comprises of all institutional 
buyers (of products and/or services) from different industries located in Dar es Salaam. 
Those which are located in Dar es Salaam from the list were randomly selected and those 
whose location indicate else where were telephoned to check if they have an office in Dar 
es Salaam and then be included in sampling frame. 
 
Sampling method is categoried in probabilistic and non-probabilistic sampling. Under 
probability sampling, each member in the population has an equal chance of being selected 
but in non-probability sampling the probability of each member to be selected is known in 
advance. Moreover, probability sampling is further categorised into simple random 
sampling, stratified random sampling, systematic and cluster sampling (Churchill and 
Brown 2004). The use of simple random sampling was employed in this study where each 
buyer in the list of customers provided by the company has an equal chance of being 
selected. 
 
 Sample size 
Although this study use simple random sampling to obtain respondents, little or none has 
been done from different literatures on determine what describe the good sample size in 
relation to number of variables. (MacCallum et al. 1999) failed to provide the general rule 
of thumb in sample selection and instead they provide basic guideline in sample size 
determination. Communality of variables and level of over determination (when number of 
strength of cause is insufficient) may guide on the size of sample. However, a reasonable 
sample is important for the proposed hypothesis to be tested as suggested by (Christensen 
2000). (Hayduk 1987, Boomsma 1985) state that, sample size of 100 to 150 can be used. In 
addition to that, (Bearden, Sharma, and Teel 1982) proposed that, a sample size of wide 
range of 200 to 400 can be used for simple models. 
 
On the other hand, a general rule exist to obtain the sample size under multiple regression 
analysis as suggested by different scholars. (Van Voorhis and Morgan 2007, Green 1991, 
Harris 1985) propose that, atleast 50 number of samples which can be increasing with the 
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increase number of independent variables. (Green 1991) further recommend the formula that 
state: 
                           N˃ 50 + 8m; where m stand for number of independent variables (IV’s).  
 
There are seven total number of independent variables in this study, hence based on the 
formula provided by (Green 1991), minimum sample size had to be 50 + 8*7= 106. A total 
number of 120 respondent were targeted and questionnaire were distributed accordingly to 
obtained a reasonable number of sample size that can be analysed. 
 
5.4.2 Key Informant data collection Technique 
Key informant technique was adopted for this study to collected data as recommended by 
(Seidler 1974). This method was not only used to collect data but also to control error during 
measurement. Measurement errors arise because of questionnaire being filled by a 
respondent who is not an expert of the study being researched. Interview with the 
representative from Superdoll has clarify that different people from these companies 
depending on the company policy are responsible for buying products from Superdoll, not 
only purchasing officers. Purchasing are done by directors for small companies, owners, 
purchasing officers, accountant, marketing officer, store manager, procurement manager or 
operation manager. This diversity of respondents rise the question of who is knowledgeable 
for the study conducted because we did not have prior information of who is responsible for 
purchasing activities in the buyers’ companies. Because the sample technique was based on 
simple random sampling, when we arrived at the office we ask about who is responsible for 
the purchases from superdoll and other suppliers then we introduce ourselves and distribute 
the questionnaire.  
 
Those who are responsible for procurement activities in the company were responsible for 
answering the questionnaire because they know enough about the purchasing they make and 
relationship with Superdoll. We motivated the respondent firms to fill the questionnaire by 
telling them that Superdoll was conducting this research to improve its performance, 
therefore each firm should give feedback through filling in the questionnaire. 
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5.4.3 Questionnaire Administration and Response Rate 
According to (Churchill and Brown 2004), a questionnaire can be administered by email, 
mail, fax, in person or over a telephone. Due to geographical disparities of companies in Dar 
es Salaam and limited time for data collection (20 January to 26 february 2017), researcher 
employed two researcher assistants, trained them on the research issues and questionnaire 
variables before data collection to ensure the same level of understanding and consistency 
in data collection. To achieve high level of response rate, the researchers visited companies 
in person to distribute the questionnaires and then personally collect them after the 
respondents have filled them. This also enabled the researchers to conduct face-to-face 
interview for more clarification. 
 
Among 120 questionnaires distributed, 86 out of them were filled out and make the response 
rate for this study to be 72% approximately. This response rate was achieved with the use of 
face-to-face interview method because other companies were agree to be asked questions 
and researcher fill the questionnare himself or herself. 
 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the research design used, data collection procedures and sampling 
frame. Cross-sectional correlation has been identified as core research design for this study 
with simple random startegy for sample selection from population. Questionnaire 
development process has been shown with the clarification of key informant technique used 
in data collection by personal administer questionnaire to yield high response rate. The 
subsequent chapter will present the development process and operationalization of each 
variable. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MEASUREMENT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES 
6.1 Introduction 
Measurement development model and operationalization of variables are presented in this 
chapter. In this chapter, each construct is defined and their respective measures are outlined. 
Moreover, the chapter shows from which literature the measures where adapted and 
constructed to fit this study. All measures of independent variables and dependent variable 
are measured by multi-item 7-point likert scale while the control variable is measured by 
using single-item scale. 
 
6.2 Measurement Process 
This study follows different guidelines in measurement designing of constructs as suggested 
by different researchers (Churchill 1979, Churchill and Peter 1984, Kerlinger 1986). 
Measures which formulate hypotheses of this study were established after an extensive 
literature review to get the clue on how other researchers measure the same variables as used 
in this study. Both multi-item and single-item were used to operationalize the constructs.  
 
While six variables (independent and dependent variables) in the research model use multi-
item scale, only two variables which form a control variables (relationship duration and 
purchase volume) in the research model was constructed by using single item. Multi-item 
scale was most favored in this study due to its proven ability to increase the dimensionality, 
reliability and validity of a construct to a study compared to single-scale item (Peter 1979, 
Kaiser et al. 2012, Hinkin, Tracey, and Enz 1997, Anderson and Gerbing 1982, Steenkamp 
and Trijp 1991). Poor measurement development may lead to modal invalidation and, thus, 
poor research conclusion. 
 
Nevertheless, single-item scale in this research will not undergo validity test rather it will be 
measured as the natural logarithm of the past relationship period between buyer and seller 
and buyer purchased volume (Buvik and Haugland 2005, Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003, 
Anderson and Weitz 1989). 
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6.3 Measurement Model 
All the variables in this research are operationalized by using multi-item reflective scale 
(Bollen and Lannox 1991) with exceptional to control variables. Reflective model is one 
among the two model mostly used in inter-firm researches. The other type of model is called 
composite model. Although both models use multiple indicators, reflective model shows the 
direction of causality from construct to measures meaning that, removal of a measure does 
not change the meaning of a construct because the measurement of error occur at an item 
level (Jarvis, Mackenzie, and Podsakoff 2003).  
 
Studies also suggest the use of reflective model because, under a latent construct, correlation 
between variables should occur and there must be consistency of indicators (Bollen and 
Lannox 1991, Bollen 1984) as compared to formative model where internal consistency is 
not expected to occur and the causality is from measure to construct meaning that errors are 
considered at construct level (Jarvis, Mackenzie, and Podsakoff 2003).  
 
Figure 6. 1: Measurement Models 
 
Source: (Jarvis, Mackenzie, and Podsakoff 2003) 
 
Choosing the right model for the measurement will ensure the reliability of research 
findings. Appropriate combination of measures under a latent variable in a multiple scale 
will reduce errors and guarantee reliability and validity (Epstein 1983). Variations of item 
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measures cause variation in the construct under composite/formative model because latent 
constructs is formulated as a combination of its indicators while, on the other hand, latent 
construct of reflective model exists independent of its measures therefore, variation in items 
measures does not cause variation in the construct (Jarvis, Mackenzie, and Podsakoff 2003). 
6.4 Measurement of Research Variables 
In this section, different items that combined to make variable are listed. This study has only 
one dependend variable; long-term orientation (LTO); five independent variables; 
opportunism (OPPORT), supplier performance satisfaction (PERFORM), buyer-specific 
investment (BUYSPECINV), supplier-specific investment (SUPSPECINV) and supplier 
flexibility (FLEX); and two control variables; relationship duration (DURATION) and 
purchase volume (PURCHASES). 
 
6.4.1 Dependent Variable 
Long-term Orientation (LTO) 
Long-term orientation is the study dependent variables. This variable is constructed by six 
items adopted and modified to capture the information about long-term business orientation 
to fit the research problem in this study (Anderson and Weitz 1989, Heide and Stump 1995, 
Noordwier, John, and Nevin 1990, Ganesan 1994, Heide and Miner 1992, Lusch and Brown 
1996). Long-term orientation construct was modelled using 7-point likert scale from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. 
 
LTO 1: We expect our relationship with this supplier to continue for a long time in the 
future 
LTO 2: Our company has made plans for future purchase with this supplier 
LTO 3: We believe that our company’s profit will be realized with this supplier in the long    
             run 
LTO 4: Long-term orientation with this supplier is crucial for our business 
LTO 5: The investments we have made in this relationship will yield more returns in the       
             long run 
LTO 6: We expect that our contract with this supplier will be generally renewed for a long 
             time in the future 
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6.4.2 Independent Variables 
Opportunism (OPPORT) 
This variables measure the supplier opportunistic behavior for own self interest. Its measure 
where adopted from different opportunism literatures (Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003, 
Dwyer, Shurr, and Oh 1987, Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000, Achrol and Gundlach 1999, Wathne 
and Heide 2000). Opportunism was modelled by 7-point likert scale form “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree”. 
OPPORT 1: Frequently, this supplier makes false promises regarding the provision of  
                    technical support assistance 
OPPORT 2: This supplier very often use emergency situation to show its effort in service 
                     improvement 
OPPORT 3: This supplier is often deny to accept responsibilities regarding the poor 
                      quality of the product in advance 
OPPORT 4: Frequently, this supplier provides us with false information regarding the life 
                     time of the product 
OPPORT 5: This supplier does very often alter information regarding the products/services  
                     to take advantage for his own benefit 
OPPORT 6: This supplier very often uses unanticipated events in our comapny to charge us 
                     extra money 
OPPORT 7: Repeatedly, this supplier provides us with products/services contrary to what                      
                     has been agreed in the contract 
 
TRUST  
This variable was develop to measure how much a buyer trust the supplier in their business 
transaction. Items to measure trust were adapted from (Ganesan 1994) and (Cannon et al. 
2010). Trust was modelled by reflective  7-point likert scale form “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree”. 
 
TRUST 1: This supplier takes our business into consideration when making important  
                  decision 
TRUST 2: This supplier always fulfils its promises to our company 
TRUST 3: This supplier always provides us with the right information regarding product  
                  and services 
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TRUST 4: This supplier always uses friendly and informal approaches to resolve any  
                  conflicts with our company 
TRUST 5: We trust that this supplier’s future decisions will affect our business in a very  
                  satisfactory way 
TRUST 6: This supplier is trustworthy 
 
Buyer-specific investment (BUYSPECINV) 
These are investments of any form that have been  by a buyer to a supplier in a such that 
switching to another supplier create a sunk cost effect. This constructs was measured by 
items adopted from (Heide and John 1990, Stump and Heide 1996, Heide and Stump 1995, 
Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003, Ganesan 1994). 7-point likert scale form “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree” was used. 
 
BUYSPECINV 1: A certain amount of money is paid in advance to this supplier when  
                              a product is ordered or service contract is signed 
BUYSPECINV 2: Our company has developed a customised information sharing system  
                              that notify this supplier of any requirement needed 
BUYSPECINV 3: Our company has invested in a specialized quality assurance program  
                              with this supplier that ensures performance and safety of tires and  
                              trailers  
BUYSPECINV 4: If our company decided to move to another supplier, a substantial part  
                              of our investment we made to accomodate this supplier will be less  
                              value 
 
Supplier-specific investment (SUPSPECINV) 
Investments of these form are made by supplier to accomodate a buyer in such a way that 
they have got less value outside that relationship. Constructs was modelled in a 7-point likert 
scale form “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” and items were adopted from (Anderson 
and Weitz 1992, Heide and John 1990, Ganesan 1994, Stump and Heide 1996, Heide and 
Wathne 2004). 
 
SUPSPECINV 1: This supplier has made significant investments in equipment to  
                              accommodate our business 
SUPSPECINV 2: This supplier has made significant investment in technology to  
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                             accommodate our business 
SUPSPECINV 3: This supplier has made significant investment in training to  
                             accommodate our business 
SUPSPECINV 4: This supplier has devoted a lot of time and resources in fulfilling our  
                             routinely service requirement 
SUPSPECINV 5: This supplier has made significant investments in logistics service that  
                             meet our service requirement. 
SUPSPECINV 6: This supplier has made considerable investments in training its staff to  
                             equip them with specialized knowledge to fit our service requirements. 
SUPSPECINV 7: This supplier spends a lot of resources to coordinate its operations with  
                              our company. 
SUPSPECINV 8: In case our company decided to switch to another supplier, this supplier  
                             will lose significant part of its investments they have made doing  
                             business with our company. 
 
Flexibility (FLEX) 
Flexibility was measured from buyer’s side to reflect on the supplier response to buyers’ 
request to change. This variable was modelled as a 7-point likert scale form “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree” and measures were adopted from (Heide and Wathne 2004, 
Noordwier, John, and Nevin 1990, Ryu, Park, and Min 2007). 
 
FLEX 1: When an unexpected situation occurs, this supplier always form a new agreement  
                rather than forcing our company to refer to the old agreement. 
FLEX 2: The price can be negotiated with this supplier in case of any price changes in the  
               environment. 
FLEX 3: This supplier is very flexible to modify terms of contract when unexpected event  
                occurs. 
FLEX 4: This supplier is very flexible to allow open discussion when there is changes in  
               product specifications. 
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6.4.3 Control Variable 
Relarionship Duration (DURATION) 
Duration of the existing relationship was included in this research as a control variable. The 
length of time that buyer and seller have been in a  relationsh determine to what extent they 
are willing to go on doing business together. This variable was measured as a single item 
scale (Anderson and Weitz 1992, Ganesan 1994, Ryu, Park, and Min 2007) to obtaine 
number of years that buyer and seller have been in a relationship. Duration of the relationship 
was transformed to natural logarithm to ontain nonlinear values because the experience of 
the buyer and seller in a transaction relationship accrues at a decreasing rate (Heide and 
Miner 1992). 
 For how long have you been doing business with this supplier? ..............Years 
 
Purchase volume 
Following the research work by (Buvik and Haugland 2005, Bensaou and Anderson 1999) 
purchase volume in this study was operationalized as a single item scale. This construct 
was then measured by taking the natural logarithm of the total annual purchases (in dollar 
value) by each surveyed client of Superdoll. The construct was measured by a single open 
question: 
How much in terms of monetary/percentage value  did your company purchase from this 
supplier during last year? ……………………… USD $ 
 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
The focus of this chapter was on measurement development process and measurement 
models. Furthermore, the chapter presented how different constructs were operationalized  
and how different measures were obtain from previous studies. Both dependent and 
independent variables were multi-item modelled by 7-point likert scale form “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree” while control variables were measured as single-item scale in 
natural logarithm form. Validity and reliability of questionnaire is measured in the coming 
chapter 7 where all the measures under each construct were examined to check if they are 
able to measure what were intented to be measured. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DATA SCREENING AND VALIDATION 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the examination of quality of empirical data collected to test the 
hypotheses proposed for this study. In this chapter, data screening process is presented 
together with reliability and validity of measures. The chapter also presents the measurement 
model validation to examine how good our measures fit research model. 
7.2 Data screening 
Data screening ensure the validity of research findings. It is important to check for any errors 
occurred during data collection and data entry for further analysis. In this study, IBM SPSS 
22 was used and frequency distributions were used to check the accuracy of data entry, 
examine missing data and outliers. Furthermore, normality assessment was carried out. 
7.2.1 Data Accuracy and Descriptive Analysis 
Due to the small sample situation assessing for accuracy of data entry was essential in this 
study as recommended by (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). This first step in the data screen 
was conducted by comparing each response in the questionnaire with what were entered in 
the computer. This process of proof-reading enable the author to identified some errors and 
immediate correct them. Also, the descriptive statistics was conducted to enable further data 
accuracy assessment and one of the major problem was found where in one of the response 
the maximum was 67 instead of 6. The proof-reading helped in screening some of errors 
which could bring problem in data analysis in later stages as it indicates that all measures 
were in a possible range of 1 to 7. 
 
Descriptive analysis was also performed to designate the characteristics of each measure by 
showing its mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum value (Appendix 2a). Table 
7.1 below also indicates the descriptive analysis of single item scale before they were 
checked for outlier. These values were then transformed in natural logarithms for normality 
check (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). This is recommended for data with extreme values for 
normality check. Purchase volume ranges from 3000 to 261,000,000 USD and duration 
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ranged from 4 to 26 years but after transformation the maximum values became 19.38 and 
3.26 for purchases and duration respectively (Table 7.2). 
 
Table7. 1: Descriptive Analysis of Sample Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Duration 86 4 26 10.24 5.087 
Purchases 86 3,000 261,000,000 8,472,831.12 38,056,621.624 
  
Table7. 2: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Statistics After Outlier Assessment 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Duration 86 0 3.26 1.9884 .67656 
Purchases 86 8.01 19.38 12.1961 2.46991 
 
7.2.2 Missing Data Assessment 
Data set may have missing values due to different reasons, including failure of some 
respondent to answer some questions, errors during data entry or some respondent refuse to 
fill in sensitive data (Hair et al. 2010). The questionnaire of this study includes other 
variables like annual sales of buyers which thought to be used but not included in the 
analysis. Missing values were identified in this variable due to its sensitivity nature. 
Therefore, it was ignored since the variable was not used in the analysis (Kline 2011). All 
the likert scale variables and other variables (number of employees, purchase volume and 
duration) did not have any missing values. 
 
7.2.3 Assessment of Outliers 
All cases with extreme values on a single construct or combination of constructs are regarded 
as outliers. These values appear outside the normal distribution during data analysis due to 
its higher values as compared to other values in the data set (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). 
For all multi-items scale constructs, the measure with higher standardized scores was 
regarded as outlier. Drawing from (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007) cut-off point for outlier 
assessment was proposed to be 3.3 for z-scores. 
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IBM SPSS 22 was used to compute for standardized scores for every measures automatic, 
and then descriptive statistics was run to obtain the minimum and maximum value. All the 
measures were within the range except for FLEX 4, TRUST 2, OPPORT 4 and PERFORM 
which were examined to be outliers with z-scores range from 3.7 to 4. Although some 
research recommend that outliers to be deleted (Pallant 2016), others recommend that 
deletion of few outliers like what identified here may distort multivariate analysis (Hair et 
al. 2010). Following (Hair et al. 2010) recommendation, outlier  cases were retained for 
further analysis. 
7.2.4 Assessment of Skewness and Kurtosis for Normality Check 
Skewness and kurtosis can be used to assess the normality of data. This is a  measure of data 
correspondence with normal distribution curve (Pallant 2016). While skewness measure the 
degree of symmetry about the mean, kurtosis measure the distribution of data about the peak 
of the distribution. Likewise, when large scores fall under left side it indicates positive 
skewness but negative skewness shows that large scores lie on the right tail as compared to 
left tail. While, on the other hand, positive kurtosis means the normal distribution is too peak 
and negative kurtosis indicated by flat distribution.  
 
For perfect normal distribution both skewness and kurtosis have zero value, apart from that 
it shows departing from normality (Kline 2011, Pallant 2016, Hair et al. 2010). There is no 
clear definition about what is regarded to be a best measure of departure lead from normality. 
Rule of thumb have been suggested by different researchers. (Hair et al. 2010) suggested 
that, kurtosis values should not exceed ±3 and skewness values should fall within the range 
of ±1. On the other hand, (Kline 2011) stated that the value greater than 3 and 10 for 
skewness and kurtosis respectively pose a serious problem, but less than that is reasonable 
(Appendix 3a, 3b, 3c). In this study, following the later recommendation by (Kline 2011), 
no single variable was removed for normality violation. All variables were retained for 
further analysis. 
 
7.3 Uni-dimensionality 
Internal consistency can be measured by using different approaches to obtain good fit of 
constructs. The examination of unidimensionality is important for both reliability and 
validity measurement (Segars 1997) and can only be address by CFA (Hoyle 2000, Segars 
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1997). It is recommended that multiple indicator measurement must be carried out to 
measure the unidimensionality of constructs to a model (Hattie 1985). This study carried out 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to measure both the internal and external consistency 
of the items. Each construct must be defined by more than two indicators where these 
indicators are formulated to measure only one respective construct (Segars 1997). In 
measuring internal consistency, items correlation and reliability measures were employed. 
7.3.1 Items Correlation Analysis 
This study focus on item-total correlation to measure the correlation of items. Different 
studies have suggested that correlation of items be greater than 0.3 to reach the acceptable 
level of correlation under item-total correlation (Pallant 2016, Hair et al. 2010, Field 2009). 
For any item with value of correlation below 0.3 should be removed for further analysis.  
(Appendix 2b) shows the item-total correlation of each items. It also shows the maximum 
and minimum of correlation of items in each variable for easy demonstration of threshold of 
0.3 and above. From this consideration, total of nine items were removed (PERFORM 4, 
PERFORM 1, OPPORT 2, OPPORT 5, TRUST 4, BUYSPECINV 1, LTO, 3, LTO 4 and 
FLEX 4) due to low correlation value. The remaining measures were retained for reliability 
assessment. 
7.3.2 Reliability Assessment 
Reliability refers to the degree at which measures are reflecting what is intended to measure 
under a given construct. It is a necessary assessment prior to validity measurement. (Field 
2009) specify two aspects of reliability measurement, test-retest reliability and split-half 
reliability. These methods posse various problems which can lead to different result from 
the same data (Field 2009). Cronbach alpha is a common method that overcome different 
problems in reliability measurement though it faced some criticism (Cronbach 1951, Hattie 
1985). One of the reason Cronbach alpha was criticized is due to its increasing degree of 
reliability with the increasing number of constructs. Despite this criticism, Cronbach’s alpha 
is still used and recommended by researchers (Pallant 2016, Field 2009). 
 
Value of 7 Cronbach’s Alpha is regarded as good indicator of good reliable measure (Pallant 
2016). On contrary, reliability can also depend on the number of sample size where small 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.3 can be used in a large sample size while 0.6 for small size of 100 
number samples (Hair et al. 2010). This study use IBM SPSS 22 to automatically obtain 
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high Cronbach’s alpha of construct if item with low correlation below 0.3 were deleted. The 
following table 7.3 indicate the value of Cronbach’s Alpha of each construct and item 
selected under each variable. This table of result was obtained after deleting items with low 
correlation as demonstrated from the last section. Cronbach’s Alpha if item deleted column 
in SPSS shows the impact of change in the value of (α) if the respective item was to be 
deleted. 
 
Table7. 3: Reliability Scores 
Constructs Items No. of 
Items 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) 
Composite 
Reliability 
PERFORM PERFORM 2,3,5 3 0.733 0.75 
OPPORT OPPORT 1,3,4,6,7 5 0.815 0.82 
TRUST TRUST 1,2,3,5,6 5 0.743 0.77 
BUYSPECINV BUYSPECINV 2,3,4 3 0.737 0.76 
SUPSPECINV SUPSPECINV 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
8 0.771 0.81 
LTO LTO 1,2,5,6 4 0.781 0.79 
FLEX FLEX 1,2,3 3 0.761 0.79 
 
 
The table 7.3 above shows the Cronbach’s alpha of each construct after items with less than 
0.3 item-total correlation removed. Cronbach’s alpha of the remain construct is above 0.7, 
therefore the constructs above are reliable for this study. Likewise, Composite Reliability3 
(CR) results show almost the same values as of Cronbach’s Alpha. These values (as shown 
in table 7.3 above) are computed by using standardized factor loading from CFA output, and 
they indicate strong reliability of measures. 
 
7.4 Construct Validity Assessment 
In the assessment of construct validity, the establishment of discriminant and convergent 
validation is important (Campbell and Fiske 1959). Although other research show three 
                                                 
3 CR= Square of the sum of all factor loadings of a construct/ (Square of the sum of all factor loadings of a 
construct + sum of all error variances of a construct) 
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types of construct validity to include nomological validity in addition to those two 
mentioned earlier, (Churchill 1979) recommend the use of only discriminant and convergent 
validity in the assessment of construct validity. All measures in this study were adopted and 
formulated to fit the context of this research after extensive literature review in long-term 
previous studies to ensure content validity. Before the survey was conducted, questionnaire 
was reviewed by experienced researchers and few practioners of automobile business and 
their comments were also incorporated for validation assurance. Both Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) were employed in this study to 
assess discriminant and convergent validity. 
7.4.1 Discriminant Validity 
Discriminant validity ensure that measures of construct are not related to each other 
(Campbell and Fiske 1959). This means that measures of constructs in a model are not 
similar (Zahoor et al. 2017). In the SPSS this can be indicated by falling of different 
constructs in the different factor loading in SPSS rotational matrix (Pallant 2016). EFA 
assessment was performed with varimax rotation to all remaining measures after reliability 
assessment to establish the initial discriminant and convergent validity test (Churchill 1979, 
Field 2009).  
 
Cross-loading factors were first assessed in the EFA by considering the cut-off point of 0.5 
as recommended by (Hair et al. 2010). Looking at exploratory factor analysis (table 7.4), 
cross-loading factors with value above 0.5 (SUPSPECINV 1, SUPSPECINV 2, 
SUPSPECINV 3) were removed for further analysis. Also all measures of trust (TRUST 1, 
TRUST 2, TRUST 3, TRUST 5, TRUST 6) were removed because they fall under one factor 
with LTO which means that their measures are related (Pallant 2016).  
 
The removal of trust measures and cross-loading factors lead to KMO Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy value of 0.68, which shows the significance level of sampling adequacy (Hair et 
al. 2010, Zahoor et al. 2017). Also, existance of correlation was described Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity which have Chi-Square value of 897.915 at degree of freedom 253 ( at p = 0.00). 
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Table7. 4: Test of Discriminant Validity Exploratory Factor Analysis (n = 86) 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
  
FACTOR 1 
SUPSPECINV 
FACTOR 2 
OPPORT 
FACTOR3 
LTO 
FACTOR 4 
BUYSPECINV 
FACTOR5 
FLEX 
FACTOR 6 
PERFORM 
SUPSPECINV3 .804           
SUPSPECINV6 .770           
SUPSPECINV5 .755           
SUPSPECINV7 .709           
SUPSPECINV4 .551           
OPPORT3   .906         
OPPORT4   .785         
OPPORT1   .715         
OPPORT6   .666         
OPPORT7   .612         
LTO2     .849       
LTO1     .733       
LTO5     .664       
LTO6     .593       
BUYSPECINV2       .715     
BUYSPECINV3       .697     
BUYSPECINV4       .579     
FLEX3         .770   
FLEX1         .762   
FLEX2         .720   
PERFORM3           .864 
PERFORM2           .798 
PERFORM5           .570 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.a 
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
 
The rotation matrix above in table 7.4 display the result of six factors solution ranging 
between 0.551 and 0.906 with factors below 0.5 left out for further analysis. Therefore, data 
presented in the table pass discriminant validity. 
 
Following previous studies (Segars 1997, Hair et al. 2010) mention that, discriminant 
validity can also be measures by using Average Variance Extracted (AVE)4 with the 
comparison of squared inter-correlation Test (Fornell and Larcker 1981, Zahoor et al. 2017). 
In this assessment, the squared inter correlation among the factors was compared with AVE 
and results are shown in appendix 4.  AVE values among constructs are higher as compared 
to that of the squared inter correlation. Therefore, discriminant validity is achieved as 
                                                 
4 AVE= Sum of all squared factor loadings/ (Sum of all squared factor loadings + Sum of all error variance 
of a construct) 
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recommended by (Fornell and Larcker 1981, Segars 1997, Hair et al. 2010, Zahoor et al. 
2017). 
 
7.4.2 Convergent Validity 
Convergent validity refers to the extent of agreement of different measurement of items in a 
common construct. This involve the sharing of variance at large extent by multiple measures 
which form one construct (Hair et al. 2010). Convergent validity occurs if such agreement 
exists. It is a preferred measure of scale validity for the constructs of multiple scale items. 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Composite Reliability (CR) of each construct were 
used to measure the construct validity (Zahoor et al. 2017). In measuring convergent 
validity, AVE of each construct should be greater than 0.5 while the value of CR should be 
higher than those of AVE (Zahoor et al. 2017). Appendix 4 also display the values of CR 
greater than AVE in each construct while AVE values of each of the construct were above 
0.5 expect for factor 4 (SUPSPECINV) AVE=0.46 and LTO AVE=0.49 which are close to 
0.5, hence convergent validity was achieved.   
 
As discussed earlier on validation measurement model, AMOS 22 was used to validate 
constructs based on different measures of goodness of fit like, Chi-square test, Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) and Comparative 
Fit Index (CFI). All 7 point Likert scale constructs were assessed for convergent validity but 
single-items scale in this study (DURATION AND PURCHASE VOLUME) were not 
assessed. This is because, single item scale is fully assumed to measure what they are 
intended to measure in a construct (Kaiser et al. 2012). Convergent validation was done by 
considering one factor at a time (Buvik and Reve 2002).  
 
Results from the CFA are presented in table 7.5 below with good standardize factor loadings 
above 0.5 threshold and absolute t-value above 2 as recommended (Hoyle 2000, Pallant 
2016), hence they are valid measure of the model. Although the overall model shows the 
model fit, some of the constructs indicate the inadequate fit to the model. As displayed by 
the table below, performance (PERFORM), buyer-specific investment (BUYSPECINV) and 
flexibility (FLEX) has insignificant fit index due to the three number of items (Buvik and 
Reve 2002). Another factor which presented inadequate fit to the model is LTO (x2=14.1; 
df=2, p=0.01; CFI=0.88, RMSEA=0.2). 
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Table7. 5: Construct Validity Assessment (n = 86) 
          
Construct Items 
Standardize 
Loading  
Unstandardize 
Loading Fit Indices 
    (T-value)     
PERFORM 5 0.55 1 GFI= 1 
(Supplier Performance) 3 0.76 (4.17) 1.19 CFI= 1 
  2 0.79 (4.1) 1.46 RMSEA= 0.4 
OPPORT 7 0.53 1 X2= 5.54 df 5 
(Opportunism) 6 0.54 (3.989) 0.87 P= 0.35 
  4 0.73 (4.75) 1.32 GFI= 0.97 
  3 0.96 (5.08) 1.95 CFI= 0.99 
  1 0.68 (4.51) 1.41 RMSEA=0.03 
BUYSPECIN 4 0.54 1 GFI= 1 
(Buyer Specific Investment) 3 0.88 (4) 1.41 CFI= 1 
  1 0.71 (4.4)  1.52 RMSEA=0.49 
SUPSPECINV 7 0.7 1 X2= 8.81 df 5 
(SupplierSpecificInvestment) 6 0.77 (5.8) 1.07 P= 1.12 
  5 0.7 (5.4) 1 GFI= 0.96 
  4 0.5 (4.2) 0.68 CFI= 0.96 
  3 0.69 (5.3) 1.05 RMSEA=0.09 
LTO 6 0.59 1 X2= 14.2 df 2 
(Long Term Orientation) 5 0.55 (4.07) 1.07 P= 0.001 
  2 0.82 (4.69) 1.61 GFI= 0.93 
  1 0.8 (4.1) 1.23 CFI= 0.88 
        RMSEA= 0.2 
FLEX  3 0.98 1 GFI= 1 
(Flexibility) 2 0.59 (4.18) 0.66 CFI= 1 
  1 0.63 (4.3) 0.69 RMSEA= 0.5 
 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter was very important as it established the measurements of the model before 
regression analysis in the coming chapter 8. Both CFA and EFA were performed to estimate 
the measures which fit the model for further regression analysis. Number of measures where 
dropped-out due to different reasons including cross-loading problem and unreliability. Next 
chapter will explain about the regression analysis and hypotheses testing for this research 
model. 
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CHAPTER 8 
HYPOTHESES TESTS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the regression model and estimation results after the data were 
checked for reliability, validity and model fit in previous chapter. After regression analysis 
estimation, hypotheses will be tested and summary of the test results will be provided at the 
end of the chapter. 
8.2 Regression Model 
Regression model in this study is estimated by Multiple Moderated Regression Analysis 
(MMRA), a parametric method mostly used in social science quantitative research (Pallant 
2016). Multiple Regression is preferred because of its ability to test interaction effects 
between continuous or categorical variables (Aiken and West 1991). The regression model 
in equation 8.1 was formulated from research model in chapter 4 (see figure 4.1) to include 
dependent variable, independent variables and interaction effect. The product of interaction 
effect was formulated after variables were mean centered to alleviate the multi-collinearity 
problem. The regression model for this study is thus presented in mathematical form as 
follows: 
 
LOT= b0 + b1 PERFORM + b2 OPPORT + b3 BUYSPECINV + b4 SUPSPECINV +           
b5 FLEX + b6 DURATION + b7 PURCHASES + b8 SUPSPECINV x FLEX + 
ε                                                                                                                   …… (Equation1) 
 
Interaction effect was assessed by taking the partial derivative of the LOT with respect to 
SUPSPECINV and the new equation was formed as follows: 
 
δ LOT/ δ SUPSPECINV = b4+ b8 (FLEX)                                                ......... (Equation 2) 
 
Where:  
Dependent variable : 
          LOT Long-term Orientation 
Independent variables: 
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          PERFORM       Supplier Performance 
          OPPORT       Supplier Opportunism 
          BUYSPECINV        Buyer Specific Investment 
          SUPSPECINV         Supplier Specific Investment  
          FLEX       Supplier Flexibility 
Control Variables: 
          DURATION    Existing relationship duration (The natural logarithm of duration) 
          PURCHASES    Buyer purchase volume (The natural logarithm of purchases) 
Interaction Effect: 
          SUPSPECINV x FLEX     Supplier specific investment X Supplier flexibility 
8.3 Estimation Results  
8.3.1 Correlation Matrix 
To avoid the problem of multicollinearity, this study mean centered all the variables that 
constitute the interaction effect (Aiken and West 1991, Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003). 
Table 8.1 below presents the diagnostic measure of multicollinearity problem where values 
fall within the recommended threshold of 0.9 and below correlation level between constructs 
(Hair et al. 2010). The table also provides the values of mean and standard deviation and as 
it displayed by the table, mean centered constructs (SUPSPECIND and FLEX) have zero 
(0.00) value of mean and 1 for standard deviation. 
 
Table 8. 1: Correlation Matrix 
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Other researchers like (Pallant 2016, Hair et al. 2010) recommend the use of Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance to assess the problem of multicollinearity. The values 
of VIF should be above 0.1 but not greater than 10. The last column of table 8.2 indicate the 
values of VIF which are within the recommended range. 
8.3.2 Regression Analysis 
The multiple regression as shown in the 8.2 below consist of independent variables and 
control variables. Table 8.2 has two model regression results; first model (Additive model) 
is regression result without interaction and the second regression result includes the 
interaction product term (Moderator model).  
 
Table 8. 2: Estimated Model of Long-Term Orientation Relationship (LTO) n=86 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B   Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 2.498   3.215***     
PERFORM .201 .235 2.206** .725 1.380 
OPPORT -.079 -.091 -.936 .862 1.160 
BUYSPECINV .327 .405 4.056*** .826 1.210 
FLEX .001a .002 .014 .646 1.549 
SUPSPECINV .010a .012 .110 .647 1.545 
DURATION .060b .052 .559 .933 1.072 
PURCHASES .020b .048 .499 .881 1.135 
            
Model 1: R2 = 0.358, R2Adj= 0.301, F(7,78)=6.227, p=0.000  
  
(Constant) 2.244   3.121***     
PERFORM .219 .256 2.604*** .722 1.384 
OPPORT -.073 -.084 -.934 .862 1.161 
BUYSPECINV .311 .386 4.188*** .824 1.214 
FLEX .149a .193 1.674** .526 1.902 
SUPSPECINV .015a .020 .192 .647 1.546 
DURATION .076b .067 .776 .931 1.074 
PURCHASES .023b .054 .608 .881 1.135 
SUPSPECINV X 
FLEX 
.300 .380 3.854*** .720 1.390 
            
Model 2: R2 = 0.462, R2Adj = 0.406, F(8, 77)= 8.274, p=0.000, R2-change= 0.104, F-change 
(1,77)=  14.856         
aMean centered; bTransformed to natural logarithm; **p˂0.05 significant for t-value greater than 1.64 
one tail; ***p˂0.01 significant for t-value greater than 2.33 one tail 
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Hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to obtain the regression analysis results 
in this study. The summary of results presented by table 8.2 above show the model fit by 
using different indicators like R square, adjusted R square, t-values and F values as indicated 
by ANOVA output tables (appendices 5a and 5b). All the variables of interaction term were 
mean centered to mitigate the problem of multicollinearity. 
 
Regression result of model 1 show the model fit which is statistically significant at p˂0.01 
as shown by the table 8.2 above (t-value=3.215, R2 = 0.358, R2Adj= 0.301, F=6.227, 
p=0.000). The value of R2 = 0.358 means that 35% of the changes in dependent variable 
Long-term Orientation (LTO) is explained by changes in independent variables; buyer-
specific investment (BUYSPECINV) and Supplier performance (PERFORM). On the other 
hand, the value of R2Adj= 0.301 means that only 30% of the variance in dependent variable 
Long-term Orientation (LTO) is explained by the independent variables included in the 
model 1 while the remaining 70% can be explained by other factors which may affect the 
dependent variables but not included in the model.  
 
The regression analysis in model 2 include the interaction product term and the overall 
results show the model fit by considering the t-value which is statistically significant at 
p˂0.01 as presented I the table 8.2 (R2 = 0.462, R2Adj = 0.406, F(8, 77)= 8.274, p=0.000, R2-
change= 0.104, F-change (1,77)= 14.856). As compared to model one, R2 has changed from 
35% to 46% in model two. This increase in R2 may be subjected to the inclusion of 
interaction terms (SUPSPECINV x FLEX) in the model 2 in additional to main effect and 
control variables in model 1. This change in R2 is shown by the value of R2-change= 0.104 
(approximately 10%) explains that, interaction effect has contributed to the variation of 
dependent variable (LTO) by 10%. The variance of dependent variable in model 2 is 
explained by 40% by the independent variables presented in the model together with the 
addition of interaction variable, leave the remaining not-included variables to explain the 
rest of 60%. F-test was also evaluated to measure the significance of the model by its f-value 
(reference). The results show F(8, 77)= 8.274 which is significant at p˂0.05 (appendix 5a). 
 
The inclusion of interaction effects of supplier flexibility (FLEX) on Long-term orientation 
(LTO) show the effect of interacting factor on the overall model prediction.  
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Although both model have significant F-value at p˂0.05 (appendices 5a and 5b), inclusion 
of interaction effect on model 2 gives out the more prediction of both independent variables 
and interaction effect at 46% compared to that of 35% in model 1. The difference between 
two models is statistically significant because the incremental increase in R2 is greater than 
zero (Whisman and McClelland 2005). This is evidently shown by the value of R2 
change=10%. 
 
8.4 Test of Hypotheses 
In this study, the regression model 2 (table 8.2) will be used to describe the association of 
dependent variable, Long-term Orientation (LTO); independent variables supplier 
performance (PERFORM), supplier opportunism (OPPORT), buyer-specific investment 
(BUYSPECINV); the control variables relationship duration (DURATION), buyer 
purchased volume (PURCHASES) and the interaction effect of supplier-specific investment 
and supplier flexibility (SUPSPECINV x FLEX). 
In determining what influence buyer to have long-term business relationship with suppliers, 
this study has developed four hypotheses which were later tested empirically to measure 
their statistical significant in study context. Refer to the figure 4.1 in chapter 4, research 
model display four hypotheses where three are main effects and one in interaction effect. 
These hypotheses are mention below: 
 H1: Opportunism is negatively associated with long-term orientation 
 H2: Performance satisfaction is positively associated with long-term orientation 
 H3: There is positive association between buyer-specific investment and long-term  
        Orientation 
 H4: The association between supplier-specific investment and long-term orientation 
                   is significantly increased with the increase of supplier flexibility 
 
The regression result of each hypothesis is presented below as shown in table 8.2 above. The 
H4 hypothesis is an interaction effect between supplier specific investment (SUPSPECINV) 
and supplier flexibility (FLEX) which was regressed after transformed into natural logarithm 
form to avoid the problem of multicollinearity. 
The estimated from model 2 (table 8.2) was inserted into regression equation 1 and the 
following equation 3 was formulated: 
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LOT= 2.244 + 0.219 PERFORM – 0.073 OPPORT + 0.311 BUYSPECINV + 0.015 
SUPSPECINV + 0.149 FLEX + 0.076 DURATION + 0.023 PURCHASES + 0.3 
SUPSPECINV x FLEX + ε                                                                ………… (Equation 3) 
 
In the equation 3 above, the unstandardized coefficients above were used to interpret the 
regression model. These values show the average change of a respective predictor to the 
dependent variable when other factors are held constant. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
This hypothesis was regarding the factor of supplier opportunism (OPPORT) with long-term 
orientation. Regression result in Table 8.2 display the statistical result of this hypothesis as 
(b2= -0.073; t= -0.934).  
Supplier opportunism has negative coefficient of b2= -0.073 which show the negative 
association with long-term orientation. This means that, the increase of opportunism by 1% 
will decrease the chance of long-term business orientation by 7%. The negative association 
between long-term orientation (LTO) and supplier opportunism (OPPORT) is not significant 
(b2= -0.073; t= -0.934), therefore not supported. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Supplier performance (PERFORM) was statistically supported by regression result of 
empirical data because of the statistics result displayed by regression table 8.2 (b1=0.219; 
t=2.602; p˂0.01). It means that increase of supplier performance PERFORM by one 1% will 
increase long-term orientation (LTO) by 22% (b1=0.219). This hypothesis was supported by 
empirical data. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
The statistical result of buyer specific investment (BUYSPECINV) is given by table 8.2 as 
b3=0.311; t=4.188; and p˂0.01. This means that, holding other factors constant, increase 
buyer-specific investment (BUYSPECINV) by 1% will lead to the increase of long-term 
orientation (LTO) by 31% (b3=0.311). This shows that, the hypothesis is significant at 
p˂0.01 and supported by empirical data. 
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Hypothesis 4 
This is an interaction effect (SUPSPECINV x FLEX) of the research conceptual model and 
it was significantly supported by statistical result obtain in regression model 2 in the table 
8.2 (p˂0.01; b8=0.3; t-value=3.854). 
 
Separately from the interaction effect, the regression models show the results for supplier 
specific investment (SUPSPECINV) and supplier flexibility (FLEX). Result shows that, 
supplier flexibility (FLEX) is significant and statistically supported at p˂0.1 with b5=0.149 
which means that, an increase of supplier flexibility by 1% will lead to an increase of long-
term orientation by 14.9%. Table 8.2 show the result of supplier flexibility (FLEX) as 
b5=0.149; t=1.674 and p˂0.05. Supplier-specific investment (SUPSPECINV) is positively 
associated with long-term orientation but not significant (b4=0.015; t=0.192). The 
moderating effect of supplier flexibility on supplier specific investment had bought the 
significance effect on long-term orientation. 
 
 Interpretation of Interaction Effects 
Interaction or moderating effect is much emphasized in social science studies due to its 
buffering effect in variables testing (Whisman and McClelland 2005, Aiken and West 1991). 
However, other researchers like (Luce 1995, Cohen 1978) has criticize the use of interaction 
effects as they cause different scaling problems and misleading results. These and other 
criticism do not wave out the importance of interaction effect, and therefore it is still 
significant to be able to signal and interpret its effect in any research (Whisman and 
McClelland 2005)Interaction factors in this study are mean centered to avoid the problem of 
multicollinearity. 
 
Interaction effect in regression model 2 (SUPSPECINV x FLEX) was significant at p˂0.01 
with coefficient of b8=0.3 and t-value=3.854 (see table 8.2). The value of b8=0.3 means that, 
for each unit (1%) increase of supplier flexibility (FLEX) on supplier specific investment 
(SUPSPECINV), long-term orientation is increase by 30%. This coefficient can also be 
interpreted as an effect of supplier flexibility on slope relating to supplier specific investment 
and long-term orientation (Whisman and McClelland 2005). It means for every increase unit 
of supplier flexibility, the slope relating to supplier specific investment and long-term 
orientation is increased by 0.3. 
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Inserting the values of interaction effect (SUPSPECINV x FLEX) obtained from the model 
2 (table 8.2) into the partial derivative of Long-term orientation with respect to supplier-
specific investment (SUPSPECINV) in equation 2 has led to the formulation of the 
following equation 4 below:  
δ LOT/ δ SUPSPECINV = 0.015+ 0.3 (FLEX)                           ..................... (Equation 4)                                     
 
The figure 8.1 is a graphical presentation of interaction effect of equation 4 above. It displays 
the partial derivative of long-term orientation (LTO) with respect to supplier-specific 
investment (SUPSPECINV) over the range of supplier flexibility (FLEX). 
 
Figure 8. 1: The effect of supplier specific investment on long-term orientation for 
different level of supplier flexibility 
 
 
From the figure 8.1 above, the value of -0.05 on flexibility (FLEX) axis was obtain when 
the partial derivative was assumed to be zero. The figure demonstrates that, if the level of 
flexibility is increasing above -0.05 (movement along x-axis to the right from -0.05), the 
effect of supplier specific investment on long-term orientation will increase. On the other 
hand, supplier specific investment will have a decreasing effect on long-term orientation 
when supplier flexibility range below the value of -0.05 (movement along x-axis to the left 
from -0.05). 
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Control variables  
The control variables relationship duration (DURATION) has b7=0.076; t=0.776 and buyer 
purchase volume (PURCHASES) has b8=0.023; t=0.608. They both have positive 
association with long-term orientation but they are not significance.  
8.5 Hypotheses Test Summary 
Table 8.3 below provides the summary of all the hypotheses and findings. It shows that, 
among three hypotheses of main effect only two are supported by the regression analysis 
while opportunism (OPPORT) has negative effect but it was not supported by statistical 
results. The interaction effect was supported by empirical data as hypothesized. Each 
supported hypothesis is strongly significant at p˂0.01. 
 
Table 8. 3: Summary of hypotheses results and findings 
Hypothesis Association between variables Coefficients t-value Findings 
H1 
Opportunism is negatively 
associated with long-term 
orientation 
-.073 -.934 
Not 
supported 
H2 
Performance satisfaction is 
positively associated with long-
term orientation 
.219 2.604* Supported 
H3 
There is positive association 
between buyer-specific 
investment and long-term 
orientation 
.311 4.188* Supported 
H4 
The association between supplier-
specific investment and long-term 
orientation is significantly 
increased with the increase of 
supplier flexibility 
.300 3.854* Supported 
*Significant at p˂0.01 for t-value greater than 2.33 one tail 
 
8.6 Chapter Summary 
Multiple Moderated Regression Analysis was used to run regression analysis of empirical 
data of this research to allow the use of interaction product term. Factors to interaction effect 
were mean centered to mitigate the problem of multicollinearity. Furthermore, the chapter 
has presented the regression analysis result which support two main effect hypothesis and 
interaction effect. One hypothesis concerning the association between opportunism and 
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long-term orientation was not supported by statistical data though was negatively associated 
as it was hypothesized. The proceeding chapter presents the summary of findings, discussion 
of results and implication of study results to different areas. The chapter will also provide 
the limitations and areas for further studies. 
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CHAPTER 9 
SUMMARY, DISCUSSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND 
FUTURE DIRECTION 
9.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the regression analysis of the empirical data to test the 
hypotheses proposed in chapter 4. This chapter presents the summary of the research 
findings and discussion of the key result findings. Moreover, managerial and theoretical 
implications and contributions of the findings are also explained in this chapter. Lastly, the 
chapter describes the limitation to the study and area for further research that should be 
considered for future research direction. 
 
9.2 Summary of Findings 
This study intended to find the factors that buyers consider when deciding to have 
meaningful and long-term relationship with certain suppliers. It is important for suppliers to 
know how they are rated by buyers given the competition nature of today’s business. After 
an extensive literature work, author propose four hypotheses that based on the theory they 
will seems to influence long-term orientation. The study dependent variable is long-term 
orientation (LTO) and factors that proposed to lead into a long-term orientation were 
developed from Transaction Cost Theory (TCA) and Relational Contracting Theory (RCT). 
 
This research was conducted in the light of buyer-supplier relationship in industrial 
marketing. The automobile company, Superdoll Trailer Manufacture Co. Ltd was used as 
the main research setting where data were collected its buyers. Findings from this study are 
expected to help first, the company to know what are the factor important to have long-term 
relationship with their customer. Second, the study aim at adding some theoretical 
contribution by exporing factors to a long-term analysis. Third, other business practitioners 
within the field of purchasing will be benefited from this study. 
 
In chapter 4 it was proposed that, opportunism will decrease the willingness of buyers to be 
in relationship for a long time because supplier opportunism may cause the buyer to 
terminate the contract within short period of time in the existance of many suppliers. 
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Therefore, buyer opportunism negatively affect long-term orientation (H1). On the other side 
of it, supplier performance satisfaction may increase buyer’s trust and commitment on 
supplier and, thus, affect long-term orientation positively (H2). Buyer-specific investment is 
very crucial to show the level of trust and commitment to a supplier because such kind of 
investment have no value outside the relationship. If buyers decided to invest in specialized 
asset (human, technology or physical assets), it send a message that they are in for long time 
to gain the expected future long term returns. This study proposed that, buyer-specific 
invetsment is positively related to long-term orientation (H3). Supplier flexibility was 
proposed to moderate the role of supplier-specific investment on determining long-term 
relationship (H4). 
 
Table 8.2 in chapter 8 gave out the regression output of the research conceptual model. Based 
on the overall analysis of the model, it shows the good fit of empirical data to the statistical 
result with R2 = 0.462, R2Adj = 0.406, F(8, 77)= 8.274, p=0.000, R
2-change= 0.104, F-change 
(1,77)=  14.856  where n = 86 ( Appendices 4a and 4b). 
 
Hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 were the main effect of the dependent variable long-term 
orientation. As table 8.2 displayed, H2, and H3 are statistically significant at p˂0.01 and they 
have the positive association with the long-term orientation as hypothesized. H1 on the other 
hand has negative relation with long-term orientation but was not statistically supported by 
empirical analysis to affect the long-term orientation with this supplier. The moderating 
effect (H4) was significant at p˂0.01. The model 1 in table 8.2 revealed that, before 
introducing the moderating effect in the regression analysis, both flexibility and supplier 
specific investment were not significant but the introduction of interaction effect cause 
flexibility to be significant at p˂0.05 and interaction effect was also statistically significant 
at p˂0.01. Duration of the existing relationship and buyers’ purchase volume were the study 
control variables but the result found out that they are not significant though they have 
positive relationship with long-term orientation as proposed by the theories. 
 
The purpose of this study was driven by two research questions as mention in the first 
chapter of introduction. The first question was “What factors influence the long-term 
orientation in buyer-supplier relationship? Key findings suggest that, if buyers are satisfied 
by supplier performance like product quality, price and delivery terms, they are likely to 
bind with that supplier for a long-tine. This is two-way beneficial as buyers also reduce 
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transaction cost associated with making transaction with different suppliers as suggested by 
TCA theory. If a supplier does not perform in a satisfactory way and number of suppliers is 
quite big in the market, buyer will shift to another supplier given low switching cost. 
Another key finding based on regression analysis is that, buyer-specific investment creates 
lock-in effect in the relationship by making the invested asset loss its value when relationship 
ended. It also creates high switching cost condition because of the sunk cost involved. 
Investing in a specialized investment by a buyer means that, the buyer trust the supplier 
enough to risk its specialized asset for the long-term mutual benefit. Supplier sees this as a 
positive sign for long-term business relationship with a buyer.  
 
The second question stated “What is the role of flexibility in promoting long-term business 
orientation? Flexibility promote long-term orientation by moderating the effect of supplier 
specific investment on long-term relationship. This means that, supplier investment in 
specific assets is not enough to convince buyer for long-term business relationship keeping 
other factors constant.  Buyers tend to switch to another supplier if they are not satisfied by 
current supplier and that require supplier to take consideration of buyers’ need and act 
accordingly. Finding in this research suggest that, investment of specific-assets by supplier 
is of paramount to affect long-term relationship with buyers if supplier is flexible enough to 
respond to buyer’s need. 
9.3 Discussions  
According to the study of TCA, specific asset creates a bondage between buyers and sellers 
in a sense that the assets deployed in a relationship cannot be used elsewhere when that 
relationship ended (Williamson 1979). This means that partners to the business are not invest 
in specific assets unless they are sure it’s’ return is higher for a long time to cover the cost. 
Deployment of specific investment require a contractual governance to safeguard the 
investing partner against any opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1993) though itself can act 
as safeguarding means against opportunistic behavior in the presence of mutual deployment 
(Buvik and Reve 2001). Relational Contracting Theory (RCT) emphasize in the use of 
relational norms over contractual governance. These relational norms are said to develop 
when relationship evolves over a period of time, long enough to create the atmosphere of 
trust between partners (Williamson 1985, MacNeil 1978). 
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Buyer-specific investment that are likely to occur in this relationship of superdoll and its 
customers are in form of advance payment, training, information technology and quality 
assurance program. The decision of buyers to invest in specific assets in a relationship with 
Superdoll impose the signal of long-term business relationship. This is because, investment 
in specific assets have some risks including opportunity cost by tying-up cash in assets and 
advance payment; and sunk cost. Given the high level of competition between automobile 
suppliers in Tanzania, investment in specific asset by buyers with one or few suppliers means 
that buyers are willing to take that risk because its pay-off is significantly larger over a long 
period of time than the risk involved and also they have been with a supplier for a long time 
to trust that specific investment will not cause any opportunistic behavior.  
 
Superdoll is unlikely to act opportunistically in this situation even if there is asymmetrical 
deployment of specific asset by a buyer because it will affect the long-term orientation of 
relationship. The reason for this is, first; acting opportunistically to gain short term revenue 
will cause buyer to terminate the relationship with Superdoll and shift to another supplier 
which will cause loss of revenue to Superdoll for a long period of time as suggested by 
(Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003). Second, it is not in Superdoll’s interest to act 
opportunistically as suggested by (Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003) because they are 
looking for situation that buyers will be locked in a relationship for a long time. Superdoll 
is seeking to increase its market share over competitors. Empirical evidence shows that 
buyers trust this supplier and have specific invest in information sharing system and 
assurance program that are customized to fit with this supplier only. They also agreed that 
termination of business with Superdoll will cause losses to them in terms of monetary value 
but as well as relational attachment. 
 
Superdoll is a famous automobile company especially in quality products they offer to their 
clients. The brands of Superdoll have never deteriorate in quality since its establishment 
more than 20 years ago. This enable them to get customers from all kind of industries. 
During the interview with customers they said Superdoll price is very high compared to all 
the competitors but they still buy from Superdoll because of the quality of products. They 
also add up by saying that they can buy a tyre or trailer from Superdoll at the price which is 
three times of that of competitors, but it will last for a time that if they buy tyres from other 
suppliers it would have been changed three or more times. Additionally, they are satisfied 
with other performance of technical services and getting good according to their 
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specification though delivery performance has been a challenge than many customers 
complained about. 
 
Coming of Chinese product in the market has dropped Superdoll market share. Reasons for 
this has been mentioned by few customers to include cheap price of Chinese product and 
light material used to create trailer allow them to transport many products. Trailers made by 
Superdoll are heavy that’s allow transportation of few product to meet the weight 
requirement over weight bridge, thus, increase cost to buyers’ operations. Supplier 
performance satisfaction has a greater role in buyers’ financial position and competitive 
advantage (Carr and Pearson 1999). Supplier’s price has impact on buyer’s price 
determination (Wathne, Heide., and Biong. 2001); supplier’s delivery performance can 
highly affect reliability to buyer operation(Cannon et al. 2010, Monczka et al. 1998) and 
cost saving from supplier performance is likelihood to increase buyer competitive advantage 
(Sheth and Sharma 1997). Benefits and revenue from cost serving from performance 
satisfaction are likely to engage buyers in a long-term relationship from Superdoll. 
 
The reciprocal investment in specific asset by one partner followed after asymmetrical 
investment by another partner strengthen the relationship commitment (Buvik and Haugland 
2005). The result of this study shows significance of supplier-specific investment when there 
is flexibility. Investment in specific investment by supplier keeping other factors constant 
does not guarantee that buyers may retain in the relationship for a long time. If supplier 
performance is poor and buyers do not have any special bond in specific assets, switching 
to another supplier is very easy due to low switching cost. The development of relational 
norms of flexibility and trust over a period of time allow supplier to respond to buyers’ 
request of change without considering the initial contract term. The theory of RTC states 
that, after being in a relationship for a long time, relational norms will guide the relationship 
and create self-enforcing contractual governance between partners (Buvik and Haugland 
2005, Heide 1994). Superdoll’s has invested in specific asset in different number of buyers. 
To mention the few, it manages the whole fleet of oil tankers in some oil companies; invest 
in budin and telematrix technology with customers; and brand big dealers’ office. Despite 
of these investment, Superdoll is very flexible when it comes to customer request. Under 
any unexpected event, Superdoll is ready to renegotiate and modify terms and conditions of 
initial contract so that to accommodate the prevailing situation.   
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For example, Superdoll does extent payment terms to its potential buyers, may skip 
formalities of documents when there is an emergence demand and sometimes may change a 
certain system or modify oil tankers at their own or shared cost to accommodate a customer 
without necessarily refers to the contract. Not being rigid with contract terms enable the 
buyers to trust the supplier and invest in the relationship for a long time. Time of the existing 
relationship enable the development of trust that reduce the contractual governance. Partners 
trust each other not to act opportunistically for mutual benefit. 
 
Opportunism is act of seeking self-interest with guile (Williamson 1985). It has been proven 
in other TCA studies to negatively influence the continuity of business because the victim 
party may terminate the contract due to opportunistic behavior of the other party within short 
time. This is not the case in this study. Empirical data shows negative relation but not 
significant. Because Superdoll is seeking to have buyers doing business with them for a long 
time, it is unlikely to act opportunistically. 
 
Sustaining buyer-supplier relationship for a long time depend on the mutual expected benefit 
from that relationship, trust which is develop over a certain period of time and supplier 
performance especially when there are many suppliers in the market. 
 
9.4 Implication of the Study 
9.4.1 Theoretical Implications 
Many previous studies in long-term orientation has use either TCA or RTC theory but this 
study has theoretically contributed by integrating (multiple) theories of RCT and TCA. The 
significance of interaction was evidently seen in this study. The norm of flexibility is 
expected to influence long-term relationship by strengthen commitment and trust under 
specific investment. Relational norms tend to guide the relationship when buyers and 
suppliers have been in a relationship for a long time to develop relational governance 
mechanism. Long-term relationship has mutual financial benefit as well as competitive 
advantage. 
 
Long-term orientation may seem not important subject but given the level of business 
competition in today’s world it is crucial to know what factors may hold your customer 
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longer in relationship (Heide and Miner 1992, Anderson and Weitz 1989, Cannon et al. 
2010). It has been receiving scientific research attention due to its impact in buyer-supplier 
relationship. It must be worth remembered that these factors highly predict the long-term 
business relationship between buyer and sellers but they do not guarantee its occurrence.  
9.4.2 Managerial Implications 
This study has managerial implications to Superdoll customer managers on how to manage 
customer for continuity of business. Being rated by customers on how they consider 
important to decide for business continuity will enable managers to improve to customers’ 
expectations. This will also enable Superdoll and all other suppliers to know where to put 
much focus in maintaining relationship with buyers. Another managerial implication to 
Superdoll is that, they need to consider product mix with other cheap product from other 
country and design their product by using light material. This will enable them to offer wide 
range of products choice to their customers and, therefore increase its market share. 
 
Investment in specific investment is advantageous but it can be risky if the asymmetrical 
deployment is done by supplier hoping to lock-in buyers for a long time if buyers perceived 
other factors to be important as shown by the findings of this research. Having many 
suppliers in the market with alternative products or less differentiated products can increase 
the sunk cost to supplier if buyers have a power to switch between suppliers. Suppliers 
should gather all the important information of their potential buyers before deciding on 
where to invest in specific assets at the earlier stage of relationship. In addition to that, 
managers may decide to reciprocate the specific investment to buyers who already invest in 
them to avoid the risk.  
 
9.5 Limitation of the Study 
Formula for sample size provided by (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007) were used in this study  
to obtain number of samples. It suggested to use 106 samples from the population of 
customers. This number of samples fall within recommended criterion of many literatures 
suggesting to have more than 100 samples for more comprehensive study. About 120 
questionnaires were distributed to customers of Superdoll trailer manufacturer but only 86 
were collected due to time limit and political situation during data collection. 
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Another limitation is based on the findings of this empirical data which study only one 
company/supplier and its customers located in one region only. Results obtained herein may 
be difficult to generalize to other suppliers within the industry or other industries. 
 
9.6 Areas for Further Studies 
This study raises some of the issues from its main findings which give room for further 
research. First, is the importance of longitudinal studies in buyer-supplier relationship. 
Cross-sectional results allow to test hypotheses as they theoretically formulated once within 
that specific time. Longitudinal studies offer to test the significant of results over the 
extended period of time by observing the same individual/respondents for the period of study 
time. Further research may base on longitudinal studies of the same issues to observe the 
sequence and pattern of result within the same research setting. 
  
Second, it may be important to examine the dyadic exploration of factors toward the long-
term orientation. Further research may focus on the perspective of both buyers and suppliers 
to check if their proposed determinant factors may be compatible. This may also explore 
more factors in addition to what have been studied here. 
 
Third, there is opportunity to conduct the same study by using more sample size and wide 
coverage of suppliers within the industry or by integrating with other industry. Although 
opportunism was not statistical supported in this research, further studies may include the 
effect of opportunism on long-term orientation to test its significance. 
 
Lastly, because Superdoll Trailer Manufacturer Co. Ltd has been in the market for a long 
time with very quality products, it’s likely reputation factor has greater influence on its 
buyers. Future studies may include reputational of the company while researching long-term 
orientation across industries.  
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Appendix 2: 
a. Descriptive Statistics and Normality Assessment 
Descriptive Statistics 
  
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
PERFORM1 86 3 7 6.13 .764 -1.519 4.118 
PERFORM2 86 2 7 5.50 1.176 -1.067 .891 
PERFORM3 86 2 7 5.58 1.000 -.736 1.012 
PERFORM4 86 4 7 6.26 .785 -.788 -.001 
PERFORM5 86 2 7 5.34 1.164 -.922 .549 
OPPORT1 86 1 6 2.42 1.306 1.286 1.177 
OPPORT2 86 1 7 4.12 1.725 -.184 -1.285 
OPPORT3 86 1 7 2.40 1.277 1.646 2.604 
OPPORT4 86 1 7 2.00 1.127 2.271 6.651 
OPPORT5 86 1 7 2.56 1.174 1.285 1.903 
OPPORT6 86 1 6 2.21 1.007 1.757 3.986 
OPPORT7 86 1 6 1.98 1.188 1.899 4.119 
TRUST1 86 2 7 5.67 .975 -1.246 1.862 
TRUST2 86 2 7 5.90 .826 -1.849 6.495 
TRUST3 86 3 7 6.05 .796 -.801 1.412 
TRUST4 86 2 7 5.62 .960 -1.034 1.341 
TRUST5 86 2 7 5.50 1.156 -.656 .087 
TRUST6 86 4 7 6.03 .743 -1.114 2.032 
BUYSPECINV1 86 1 7 4.38 1.873 -.237 -1.248 
BUYSPECINV2 86 2 7 5.31 1.340 -1.380 1.156 
BUYSPECINV3 86 2 7 5.73 1.011 -1.885 5.191 
BUYSPECINV4 86 2 7 5.33 1.163 -.806 .422 
SUPSPECINV1 86 1 7 4.10 2.164 -.131 -1.797 
SUPSPECINV2 86 1 7 4.12 2.066 -.102 -1.714 
SUPSPECINV3 86 2 7 4.93 1.135 -1.144 1.054 
SUPSPECINV4 86 2 6 5.17 1.008 -1.348 1.404 
SUPSPECINV5 86 1 7 4.90 1.063 -1.050 1.743 
SUPSPECINV6 86 1 7 5.02 1.051 -1.415 3.199 
SUPSPECINV7 86 2 7 5.17 1.065 -1.076 .785 
LTO1 86 4 7 5.93 .699 -.115 -.372 
LTO2 86 4 7 5.93 .794 -.307 -.412 
LTO3 86 2 7 5.19 .964 -.304 .022 
LTO4 86 3 7 5.44 1.001 -.556 -.585 
LTO5 86 3 7 5.78 .758 -.768 1.564 
LTO6 86 3 7 5.97 .774 -.719 1.496 
FLEX1 86 2 7 5.40 .885 -.978 1.760 
FLEX2 86 3 7 5.73 .900 -1.225 1.774 
FLEX3 86 3 7 5.53 .822 -.896 .344 
FLEX4 86 2 7 6.01 .874 -1.752 5.130 
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b. Item-Total Correlation of each Item 
Construct Item – Total Min Max 
PERFORMANCE PERF2:     0.61     
(PERFORM) PERF3:     0.6 0.46 0.61 
  PERF5:     0.46     
SUPPLIER OPPORTUNISM OPPORT1:  0.56     
(OPPORT) OPPORT3:  0.81     
  OPPORT4:  0.67 0.49 0.81 
  OPPORT6:  0.52     
  OPPORT7:  0.49     
TRUST TRUST1:  0.40     
  TRUST2:  0.49     
  TRUST3:  0.43 0.4 0.61 
  TRUST5:  0.65     
  TRUST6:  0.61     
BUYER SPECIFIC INVESTMENT BUY2:  0.58     
(BUYSPECINV) BUY3:  0.67 0.47 0.67 
  BUY4:  0.47     
SUPPLIER SPECIFIC INVESTMENT SUP1:  0.6     
(SUPSPECINV) SUP2:  0.6     
  SUP3:  0.39     
  SUP4:  0.49 0.35 0.61 
  SUP5:  0.42     
  SUP6:  0.48     
  SUP7:  0.61     
  SUP8:  0.35     
LONG-TERM ORIENTATION LTO1:  0.63     
(LTO) LTO2:  0.68 0.52 0.68 
  LTO5:  0.52     
  LTO6:  0.52     
FLEXIBILITY FLEX1:  0.55     
(FLEX) FLEX2:  0.52 0.52 0.72 
  FLEX3:  0.72     
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Appendix 3 
a) Residual Distribution Chart 
 
 
 
 
b) Normal Probability Plot for Normality Assessment 
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c) Graphical Portray of Heteroscedasticity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Squared Inter construct correlation (R2), Average Variance Extracted (AVE) 
and Composite Reliability (CR) 
Correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. PERFORM 1 .081** .154** .079** .196** .118** 
2. OPPORT   1 .039 .012 .065* .061* 
3. BUYSPECINV     1 .164** .277** .191** 
4. SUPSPECINV       1 .203** .117** 
5. LTO         1 .184** 
6. FLEX           1 
CR 0.75 0.82 0.76 0.81 0.79 0.79 
AVE 0.5 0.5 0.52 0.46 0.49 0.57 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 5: 
a) Research’s Model Summary 
Model Summary 
Mode
l R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .599a .358 .301 .64387 .358 6.227 7 78 .000 
2 .680b .462 .406 .59333 .104 14.856 1 77 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), PURCHASES, BUYSPECINV, DURATION, FLEX, OPPORT, PERFORM, SUPSPECINV 
b. Predictors: (Constant), PURCHASES, BUYSPECINV, DURATION, FLEX, OPPORT, PERFORM, 
SUPSPECINV, SUPSPECINV X FLEX 
 
 
 
 
b) Analysis of Variance 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 18.071 7 2.582 6.227 .000b 
Residual 32.337 78 .415   
Total 50.408 85    
2 Regression 23.301 8 2.913 8.274 .000c 
Residual 27.107 77 .352   
Total 50.408 85    
a. Dependent Variable: LOT 
b. Predictors: (Constant), PURCHASES, BUYSPECINV, DURATION, FLEX, OPPORT, PERFORM, 
SUPSPECINV 
c. Predictors: (Constant), PURCHASES, BUYSPECINV, DURATION, FLEX, OPPORT, PERFORM, 
SUPSPECINV, SUPSPECINV X FLEX 
 
 
 
 
 
